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Abstract
The housing supply is affected by the market, regulation, land use, and capital. Research
has revealed a strong variation between the supply sector and builders' behavior patterns.
Understanding these variations will contribute not only to better performance of private
homebuilders, but also to more efficient housing supply policy.
Somerville's impressive research, 'The industrial organization of housing supply (1999)'
integrates systematic factors into home builders' organizational structure. In adapting his
research model, I explain builders' size distribution in markets defined by Metro Statistical
Area (MSA). I divided market factors into size, demand and cost factors, and housing
values. The impact of the regulatory environment is refined by separately testing the formal
restriction, community discretion and control, and jurisdiction structures' effects. Land
issues are measured by amount of developable area and needs of assembly for proper size
of development.
The results show that the firm size responds to price changes most sensitively. The effect of
market size shows that large area gives more growth opportunities to firms. The amount of
developable land shows higher impact on firm size than increased demand does. Density
restriction and approval delay tends to increase builder size.
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Chapter I: Introduction
The private sector players in housing development, like those in other private enterprises,
try to grow their operational capacity and scale of development. The growth in firm size not
only promises more profit within a fixed operational margin, but also scale of economy of
internalized costs. The market credibility of builders also tends to increase with their
operating capacity. However, from the perspective of preserving public goods, there is a
concern that the impact of large development and builders is too great for its neighborhood.
Therefore, the regulatory environment, imposed by formal policy or more neighborhood
control and discretion, tries to limit development that consumes the resources of a
community. However, some researches showed that those regulatory requirements can
exact a higher price of housing by transferring the cost to customers', failing to restrict
development size or builders' size. As such, research on determinants of homebuilder's size
matters not only for understanding private sectors' behavior but also for planning effective
policies.
In chapter I, I tried to show the importance of size of firms to understand the organizational
structure of homebuilders, using simple comparison of historic data in the United States.
Firms' behavior adjusting their size in response to a given situation over 20 years gave
clues for systematic variation of firm's size. In chapter II, I examine housing supply
theories to build assumptions for research design. Chapter III and IV explain research
model and data used.
1 Edward L. Glaeser, Jenny Schuetz and Bryce Ward's research, 'Regulation and the Rise of Housing Prices
in Greater Boston', showed that that housing prices might have been 23 to 36 percent lower if regulation had
not greatly slowed new permitting since 1990. Moreover, increasing average minimum lot sizes increases
median prices and individual sales prices within a community by over 10 percent.
1. Background of housing supply studies
According to DiPasquale (1999), many studies have investigated the demand for residential
housing; numerous studies have focused on pricing and market dynamics. However,
substantially less effort has been expended on investigating the housing supply. Many
puzzles in housing supply side remain unsolved. Moreover, the empirical evidence on the
supply of housing is far less convincing than that on the demand.
There are serious analytic difficulties for modeling the housing supply. First, the housing
supply is the outcome of complicated decision making among builders, the owners of
housing, landlords, and government policy. Second, the long time lag of development
makes it difficult to analyze the determinants of housing supply.2 Third, we have little
direct measurement that permits us to observe the impact of land and regulation issues on
the housing supply. Lastly, the residential construction industry is highly fragmented and
heterogeneous, so it is difficult to build and analyze a model on the basis of aggregated data.
The difficulties in investigating organization structure of housing supply side are caused by
the lack of information to measure the behavior of actors. The housing supply is the
outcome of complicated decisions made by builders and owners. In order to understand the
micro foundations of housing supply, we want data in which the unit of observation is the
supplier, with information on the quality and quantity of housing services offered,
maintenance and capital improvement decisions, rents, and asset values. In the case of new
supply, no standard data set permits us to observe the behavior of builders of new housing.
2 Dipasquale and Wheaton indicate that the stock of single-family housing adjusts to its new long-run
equilibrium through new construction very slowly; the rate of adjustment is estimated at 2% per year, which
implies that it takes 35 years to reach a new equilibrium.
In the conversion of the existing housing stock, household surveys such as the American
Housing Survey provide information on the renovation and repair decisions of owner-
occupants. No standard data set permits us to observe the behavior of investors in rental
housing. This remarkable lack of information on the major actors in housing supply
precludes a thorough understanding of housing supply. More effort needs to be made in
building new datasets that permit observation of the behavior of these important actors.
And most importantly, we need to understand how suppliers make decisions and view the
marketplace, incorporating with investors and home owners.
As indicated above, to understand housing supply, research on suppliers' behavior is
important. First of all, it is needed to select which specific actors can represent the
industrial, integrating various other actors. Players include subcontractors, general
contractors and developers. The organization of construction projects involves relationships
among the owner, the general contractor, and special trade contractors. Most typically, the
owner writes a contract with a contractor who assumes responsibility for carrying out the
project. The developer can be generalized as entity that links owner and contractors as
leading entity for project. Another major alternative to the owner-general contractor
arrangement is when the owner and general contractor are the same party, the "operative"
or "speculative" builders. 3
To cover owner, contractor and also developers perspective to market and their behavior
3 Operative builders are establishments constructing structures for sale by NAICS classification. They build
new homes on land that is owned or controlled by the builder rather than the homebuyer or investor.
pattern, operative builders seems integrated entity which encounter most decisions which
must be faced by the general contractor, owner and developers. Therefore, I choose the
operative builders as entity to observe the builders behavior over market.
2. Research Question
My interest and research questions start from the private sectors' point of view in order to
understand builders' behavior. However, many questions are related to public sectors'
concerns as depicted in picture 1.
* Are builders in larger market
bigger than those in smaller
market?
* Or, companies become
firagmentized and homogeneous
across markets?
* Are there strong restriction in
development?
* Who involved in re ulatory
process?
* Are there developable land?
* Is Land framuentized?
* access to Capital
* Price lag
Industrial Organization of
Homebuilding indus tr
* Homogenous builder in competitive
market
-0-* Monopolistic competitive malket
Land Use Regulatory Emniromnent
• Does strong re~latory shiingency
restrict large development?
* Permit process become complicated
by public participation. Is it
effective?
Housing Supply
* Need to focus on research
supplier's point of view
.* Control on monopolistic power
of large builder
- •0.1' 'Control on market price and
supply
- 0 .Control on regulato,
shtringency
i l-Public participation VS
efficiency in regulating
hPublic housing
-Control Market
[Picture 1 Summary of research question with needed test in Theory]
For builders, business opportunities in large market are different from ones in small market.
In a large market, there could be smaller and more fragmented builders due to competition
and low entry barriers. Since the market is large, individual enterprises have less
Private sectors
Perspective
Public sector
persectve
monopolistic power, and this could contribute to the fragmentation. One can argue that as
markets grow, large firms need larger development, so they become bigger. Each argument
depends on different assumptions; former is based on homogenous competitive market and
latter is based on monopolistic competition. To test each assumption is needed to make
either business decisions or policy induced one. Industrial organization structure is
important for policy makers, because they have to prevent excessive monopolistic power of
few large builders. In small market, there might by less competition. Compared to large
market, there might be more developable land in less developed market. However, there
might not be enough demand for sizable builders. Large builders may require subsidies
from public finance. Policy makers can think about attracting smaller builders rather than
few large builders. Appropriate firm size at given market structure seems needed for
housing supply.
Builders response to given situation by adjusting their size first. They expand or shrink
their operational size based on business environment such as market size, changing demand,
regulatory stringency and etc. Firm size is direct indicator of builders' response to
circumstances. A classical economic model in firm size revealed that most changes of
product demand are met by changes in firm size4. As indicated in picture I, organization
structure, land use regulation, and housing supply are major discipline which includes
important assumptions to search determinants of firm size as indicator of builders' behavior.
Literatures of each theoretical framework will be reviewed in chapter II in order to set the
assumptions for research design.
4 Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 'On the size distribution of business firms', the bell journal of economics..
Besides testing theoretical model, how to integrate various issues among different actors is
important from builders' perspective. Somerville's approach to integrate various elements
in his research, 'homebuilders' industrial organization' can be adapted. Picture 2 shows
structure of regression model in his research.
dependent Var. independent Var. Measurements
builder size = A (Market Demand) Number of permit
+ B (Land Supply) Farm Land's share
+ C (Land Assembly) Number of Firms
+ E (Regulation) Number of Jurisdiction
[Picture 2 Somervile's framework to integrate key features in housing supply]
Based on his integral approach, I'll try to explain determinants of homebuilders' size.
Compared to Somerville's research, I added refined regulatory and market variables which
will be tested through this research, as shown in picture 3. Each variable will be gathered
and reviewed in Chapter 4.
dependent I "ar. idepedevnat I "ar.
builder sixe = A (Market Demand) - ---- Market Slz
+ B (Land Supply) Market Demand
+ C (Land Assembly) 
- Constructzon Cost
+ D (Regulation) Regulatory Commuty control
nngency anddzscrtion _ Houszng Price
Eand sctFinancialon
+ Accessibiity) Regulatory Restrictzon
Etc.
[Picture 3 Structure of dependent variables to explain firm size spatial variation]
I will focus on how those various elements are associated with firm size. And also, each
variable's relative impact to firm size variation will be calculated with careful attention. I
will focus on the sensitivity test of firms' size by each variable's changes to understand the
builders' behavior.
3. A Historical Review of builder's behavior
When we look at builder's employees and establishment statistics from mid eighties to
date5, the builders have been actively synchronized with housing demand by adjusting their
size. This is more apparent when we observe the consistent level of number of
establishment and more sensitive variation of employees per establishment, under market
condition over twenty years shown in graph 1, 2, and 3.
As indicated in Graph 1, the
Average Nurrmber of estlishment of counties
(operative builders only)
average number of
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S15 establishments of counties was
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[Graph I Number of homebuilders in operation from 1986 number of establishments over
to 2007] that period is 0.09.
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[Graph 2 New starts of single-family housing from 1986 to
2007]
However, over the same period,
the average number of new
starts of single-family housing
unit shows larger volatility; one
standard deviation per mean
value is 0.17, as shown in
5 The data from 1998 to 2003 is missing, because the operative builders' survey data is integrated into
residential construction builders, which group all contractors into one industrial code. The industrial code was
changed from SIC to NAICS in 1998.
graph 2. Compared to the volatile movement of newly constructed housing stock, the
constant number of establishments made us infer that there could be more volatility in the
unit supply.
The builders seem to adjust to
Average of Errployment per establishments
of counties (operative builders)
the market by rapidly changing
0 15 their size, not by establishingE 10
z 5
o new firms or closing existing
Year ones (Graph 36). Compared to
[Graph 3 Average number of employees per establishment
by county over 20 years.] the constant level of number of
builders' establishments, the
size shows more volatility than the actual fluctuation of new housing stock. One standard
deviation per mean value of employees per establishment is 0.301, greater than one with
starts of 0.17.
According to Graph 3 and Graph 2, the fluctuation in firm size was followed by a pattern of
housing starts. Firm size decreased from 2004, and starts decreased from 2005. The number
of establishments started to increase in 2006. There are some lags between housing supply
and establishments and size of firms. The notable increase of establishments from 2006 to
2007 was followed by the increase of new housing starts and in the number of employees
per establishment. Therefore, we can infer that the builders' size as the number of
employees per establishments changes first to satisfy market demand and that changes of
number of firms comes later. The size of firms seems more responsive to market condition
6 More detailed distribution of firm's size of each year is shown in attachments 1, using box plots.
than changes of number establishments by entering or existing market are.
The size of firms, as measured by employees, shows that builders' behavior is related to the
housing supply, when the number of establishments is highly inelastic. Therefore, size of
firms seems good measure to understand builder's behavior.
However, there are points of contention in this assumption, so more rigorous research on
direct causality between size and market clearing process in demand is needed. However,
because the dynamics of demand and supply equilibrium is not within the scope of this
research, I will depend on the classical theory about the role of firm size.
Chapter II: Literature Review
The table summarizes the assumptions extracted from the literature to build research model.
[Table 1 Summary of assumptions explaining firm size]
Field Theories Theorists
-Most changes hi product demand are met by changes in filn size -Classic, Viner (1932)Fnn size
distribtion -New entry and exit of establislinents explain the demand shock *Bomn (1958), Ijanl
Industrial -Homebuildhing industly is following monopolistic competitive model .Classic
orgamuzation -Builders are homogeneous under perfect competition .Somecrvile(.99)
H Rediced fonn Approach (mainly focus on price effect on supply) Follami (19-9)
Housng
Suply (D Strctural approach • Topel, Rosen (1988),
model - umvestmnents approach - focusing on11 price and cost impact on supply *DiPasquale nd
- trban spatial approach - adding land issues to price, and cost factor Wheaton(1904)
Financial Access to capital narkets affect to Market share of homebuilders andFinlancial *Bsea A .4mose and
Aspects (VWhIere miore probleia in constmrction loan, lmaket share of private owned Joe Peek (2008)
builders suffered at the expense of the public homebuilders')
Land use -Strong refulatory strhngency leads to nicrease of cost factor of builders rather *Maisel(1 9 53) and
reulatov than being effective to preserve publc good Imnzy(1992)
-More fi'anlentfzed Junrsdiction leads to smaller development *Fishcel(1985)
Each theoretical model includes different assumptions. For example, for firm size
distribution, one argues that product demand is met by existing firm's adjusting its size. On
the other hand, others argue that market demand is adjusted by new entry and exist of
establishments of which size is fixed. As reviewed in historical data, homebuilders tend to
adjust their size to meet changes of market demand. Therefore, I assume the former
argument in firm size distribution. Similarly, industrial organization, housing supply, and
land use regulatory model are reviewed in this chapter. Based on that, I extracted
assumptions for research models, highlighted in table 1.
1. Urban Spatial Theory Approach to Housing Supply
DiPasquale (1999) states that the housing supply literature relies in reduced-form and
structural models. She also notes that the vast majority of empirical studies use aggregate
rather than micro-level data, and that future studies of the mechanics of housing supply will
require micro-level data.
Reduced-form models are useful in estimating the price elasticity of the housing supply.
For example, Follain (1979) models the supply of housing as reflecting house prices,
construction costs and the builder's cost of capital, with an interest rate serving as the proxy
for the cost of capital. Similarly, Mayer and Somerville (2000a, b) use the change in the
prime rate as a control variable in their analysis of housing supply.
The second line of literature focuses on structural models that directly model housing
supply. For example, in one of the first studies in this line of research, Poterba (1984)
follows the investment literature to examine how the housing market adjusts to a shock in
the steady state. Topel and Rosen (1988), following Poterba (1984), examine housing
supply by studying the relationship between asset prices and the marginal cost of
production. General market interest rates are again used as one of the indicators for builder
supply costs.
Urban spatial theory treats land as an input in the production of new housing. In these
models, no supply theory deals with construction flows since new construction or the flow
of housing simply equals the growth in population. Since land is different from other
factors, the literature on urban spatial theory has revealed that land prices depend on the
housing stock, not on building activity. As a result, a rise in house prices initially generates
excess returns, but the flow of construction increases only temporarily above the normal
level. As housing stock grows, land prices rise, absorb the excess returns, and then
construction returns to its normal level.
DiPasquale and Wheaton's (1994) model of housing construction combines stock
adjustment with a long-run spatially based definition of equilibrium housing stock. In this
research, I used urban spatial theory to examine the elements affecting firm size.
2. Organizational Structure of the Homebuilding Industry
Some research has focused on the industrial organization of homebuilding like Eccles's
(1981) research on builder-subcontractor relations and the vertical structure of
homebuilding. Strategic behavior by developer-builders is part of the theoretical literature
on city formation. Landis (1986) compared two cities and postulated that land-use
regulations account for differences in the size of builders active in different markets. Maisel
(1953) and Kinzy (1992) found some economies of scale at the project level in
homebuilding. However, the empirical literature is limited to general reviews of
homebuilding, providing statistics without detailed analysis.
C. Turiel Somerville's research on the industrial organization of housing supply (1999) was
the first to develop a picture of industrial structure from market and regulation perspectives.
He found that builders are larger in more active housing markets and where there is a
greater supply of land suitable for large developments. He also found that the size and
concentration of builders are sensitive to the jurisdictional regulations on land use.
However, he did not consider the relationship between builders' size and access to capital.
The sample of regulatory variables is too small and showed very low statistical evidence.
There is now a larger body of literature on the financial and regulatory aspects of the
homebuilding industry.
3. Impact of Credit Availability on the Homebuilding Industry
Bren W. Ambrose and Joe Peek (2008) studied the relationship between credit availability
and the structure of the homebuilding industry. They revealed that the growth in private
homebuilder market shares is positively related to the bank capital-to-asset ratio and
negatively related to the NPL for construction loans, while that of public homebuilders is
affected in the opposite direction. Regression analysis of in this research at the metropolitan
statistical area level supports the hypothesis that, in areas where banks were less well
capitalized and had more problem construction loans, the market shares of large private
homebuilders that relied primarily on bank credit to finance their production suffered at the
expense of the public homebuilders that had better access to external funds, in large part
due to their direct access to public capital markets.
Mayer and Somerville (1996) noted that the linkage between residential real estate
development and economic cycles is related to the traditional dependency of
developers/builders on debt financing. Somerville (2002) examines the impact of distance
on the financing activities of local lenders versus national lenders for homebuilders in
British Columbia. He documents that smaller banks are more likely to provide financing to
smaller builders, while larger, national financial institutions are more likely to extend
financing to larger developers. Based on this literature, I assumed that builders'
accessibility to financial sources affects firm size.
4. Land use regulation and housing supply
Fishcel (1985) argued that regulations exist because residents have an interest in controlling
development. In smaller jurisdictions a project of a given size is more likely to consume
local public goods. When this happens, residents restrict development to preserve the value
of the public goods. In contrast, Hamilton (1978) argued that governments adopt land-use
controls. Regulation is based on a jurisdiction's market power, which decreases as the
number of municipalities and townships increases.
Christopher J. Mayera and C. Tsuriel Somervilleb (2000) suggest that land use regulations
lower the steady-state of new construction. They also find differences by type of regulation:
development or impact fees have relatively little impact on new construction, but
regulations that prolong the development process or constrain new development have larger
and more significant effects.
Joseph Gyourko et al.'s (year) Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index project
adopted a broader approach to the regulatory environment. Their stylized index for
regulatory environments measured the differences in regulatory climate. They suggested a
spatially more heterogeneous regulatory environment, with substantial variation across
metropolitan areas, and somewhat less variability across communities within a given
market area. The most highly regulated communities tended to be more restrictive on most
of the dimensions and community wealth is strongly and positively correlated with land use
regulations.
I test the stringency of the regulatory characteristics of Wharton survey, which are
classified by their regulatory motivation based on literature, rather on the basis of
assumptions about regulatory impact. First, firm size is a cost factor to builders. In addition,
for public goods preservation, the regulatory stringency limits large development by large
builders. The effect of the jurisdiction's structure on firm size also is tested.
5. Size Distribution of Business Firms
The classic theory of firm size explains a unique size distribution based on minimization of
cost factor over long-run operation. This theory proceeds under the assumption of product
market competition. In contradiction to the theory, most changes in product demand are
met by changes in firm size, not by entry or exit of firms. Moreover, firm growth appears to
be independent of firm size. Finally, Simon, in collaboration with Bonini (1958) and Ijiri
(1964), observed that by examining the distribution of firms by size at a single point in time,
one can make inferences about the process governing firm growth and confirm that firm
growth is independent of size.
As mentioned earlier, I will assume that the builders have been actively synchronized with
housing demand by adjusting their size. Historical pattern of homebuilder's size supports
that understanding the determinants of builders' size as an indicator of the housing supply
is important.
Chapter III: Research Design
We will test each perspective's impact on firm size based on the comparison of markets in
the U.S. metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The MSA is the most inclusive single market
and uses a more rigorous statistical methodology.
1. Methodology I: Cross-sectional Comparison of Builder Size over Regions
Comparison between MSA markets will be tested with a regression model for the years of
2002, 2005, and 2007. Cross-sectional comparison based on MSA level, depends on the
homebuilder's monopolistic characteristics. Builder groups have traditionally been treated
as the subject of supply under a perfect-competition paradigm. Researchers cite the large
number of builders and the small share of the national market held by the county's largest
builders to support this assumption. For example, surveys of the National Association of
Homebuilders (NAHB) indicate that the 50 largest builders in the U.S. accounted for less
than 10% of total national single-family starts. However, recent research has found a richer
variation in industrial structure across markets. Somerville has argued that the industrial
organization of homebuilders is more complex and varied has traditionally been argued. He
showed that instead of a homogeneous competitive industry, there is a rich variation in
market structure across metropolitan areas.
1.1. Is It Random or Systematic Variation?
Variation does not necessarily reflect an underlying systematic process. If builders of
different sizes are randomly distributed across cities, the city-level mean builder size and
market share will also vary across cities, but will be invariant to exogenous factors.
Therefore, we have to test for randomness. With a random distribution, distribution of the
aggregated data of firm size of whole MSAs will mirror the within-MSA distribution.
Graph 4 reports the distribution of firm size by employment level, classified by population;
first bar is for all MSAs; second bar shows upper quartile MSAs firm size distribution; third
one is for bottom quartile; Forth shows the middle.. All are right-skewed; most operative
homebuilders are small, whose employees less than four per establishments. The MSA size
distribution is different from the distribution of each group. Upper class MSAs distribution
shows a flatter pattern with large firms, while middle and bottom quartile MSAs
distributions show a more right-skewed pattern. Therefore, it is hard to say that spatial
variation of firm size is random. It does not show a systematic characteristic of spatial
variation of firm size over region. However, it warrants more analysis of systematic
variation of builder size rather than treating them as randomly distributed.
Level of
employees
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
AlJ MSAs Upper Quartile 2nd &3rd Quartile Bottom Quartile
E 50- 701 506 185 10
* 20-49 790 470 291 29
*10-19 958 518 383 57
05-9 1435 772 535 128
01-4 6043 3216 2275 552
No of firms in each emnlovment ranv
[Graph 4 Distribution of builder size classified by employees and population of MSAs7 ]
7 Establishment's distribution by each employment class level is shown in attachment 2
1.2. Idiosyncratic elements of firm size
Although there is evidence of the systematic variation of builder size across MSA, there are
also idiosyncratic elements of firms' size. For example, the quality of the labor force is
significant when we consider the firm size in terms of the number of employees.
Entrepreneurship, corporate strategy, or leadership are important aspects of firm size, but
not systematic determinants. For example, the companies' growth strategies are not always
rational, but can be induced. Someone set the strategic purpose more aggressively or
conservatively than average. These idiosyncratic elements are related to the validity of
MSA's aggregate values. It is hard to say that MSA market size offsets those elements to
average mean value. In addition, although the market is big enough for aggregate value, the
extent of product differentiation is also problematic, which is more accurate when market
size is more narrowly defined. However, the research is focused on explaining the
systematic variation because the homebuilding industry is highly limited to its operational
aspects. In addition, when we try to extract the result for the long-run perspective, this
feature is more apparent, considering the low volatility of the real estate cycle.
2. Methodology II: Regression analysis
I based the regression analysis on aggregated data for MSAs. The average firm size of
MSAs (over 250 MSAs, mainly 2002, 2005 and 2007) is the dependent variable. Possible
explanatory variables such as demand, cost, price, MSAs area, developable land area,
regulatory environment, and financial accessibility are used and tested to explain firm size
with valid statistical providence.
I group the data by MSA size (geographical area and number of housing units) and
compare the elasticity of variables in large and small MSAs.
The general regression model follows the Somerville's framework of the industrial
organization of housing supply. It revealed a rich variation in market structure across
metropolitan areas. As summarized in Table 2,8 the elasticity of firm size is captured from
the demand, cost, land supply and regulatory perspectives. His intention is to reveal
structural differences and to prove a monopolistic hypothesis. He explained the product
differentiation effect to determine if there is theoretical support for cross-market differences
in builder firms and the likely causes of any differences. A single development occupies a
unique site, giving the builder or developer a highly localized monopoly. Product
differentiation refers to variations within a product class that (some) consumers view as
imperfect substitutes.
[Table 2 Somerville's modeling in organization structure]
one standard
deviation Employment Construction Value
increase of per establishment per establishment
As Single family 46-57% increase 76% increase
Market demand permit more demand -+ larger the builder firm
As construction cost
s icost and builder size relationship : hard to control cost dataCosts index
As Demand for high
end home per capita income income and builder size : no certain relationship.
end home
As developable Land farm land's share 13%-15% increase 27% increase
supply above MSA more available developable land supply -4 larger builder firm
21%-28% decrease 42% decrease
As the Likelihood of
land assembly Number of farms more the need to assemble the land, smaller size of project --
smaller firm size
8 The data source and summary of statistical result is shown in Attachment 3.
Therefore, his approach is based on reduced form model where price is generally a function
of supply and demand. For example, rather than investigating the price's effect on firm size,
he treated that as a function of demand and supply. However, with this focus on builders'
behavior as entity of aggregated supply, it would be better to investigate firm size with all
possible variables.
Moreover, when we consider the fact that numbers of establishments are constant over 20
years and size fluctuated with housing demand as indicated by the number of permits,
urban spatial theory's approach is better for seeing the variation in firm size. I prefer the
simple model of housing construction combining stock adjustment process with a long-run
spatially based definition of the equilibrium housing stocks.
In this model, price level and cost shifters determine the long-run equilibrium stock,
affecting firm size more directly. Therefore, I focus on a structural approach and
manipulate the variables to explain firm size under the assumptions of urban spatial theory.
3. Research Model and Variables
Based on the assumptions and research scope mentioned in the previous chapter, picture 4
shows the regression model's schematic form with variables which are measured by
empirical data. Each data's assumption will be addressed in detail by the descriptions in the
data. The market-related, land, and financial can be fundamental factors that determine firm
size. A wider spectrum of regulatory environments was segmented by community control as
local autonomy to react market and jurisdiction structure as political machine to regulate
the policy, which is mostly survey through Wharton project.
[Picture 4 Structure of variables and measurement to assess firm size spatial variation]
Equation Variables Measurement
builder size
A (Market
Activity) Demand
Cost
B (Market
Size) Geographical Size
market size
C (Housing
Price) Rent level
Price level
D (Land
Supply) Land Supply
Land Assembly
E (Regulation) Regulatory Stringency
Jurisdiction Structure
Democratic in approval
regulation as cost for
development
+ F (Financial cost)
Employees per establishment
single-family/multi-family permits
Construction Value per permit
area of MSAs
Existing Housing Stock
Fair market rent based on two-bed
Median housing value
Housing Price Index
Farmland as percentage of MSA area
Number of farms in MSAs
Factor loaded aggregated index
State Court Involvement Index (SCII)
State Political Involvement Index
(SPII)
Local Political Pressure index
Local Zoning Approval Index (LZAI)
Local Project Approval Index (LPAI)
Local Assembly Index (LAI)
Supply Restrictions Index (SRI)
Density Restrictions Index (DRI)
Open Space Index (OSI)
Exactions Index (EI)
Approval Delay Index (ADI)
Mortgage cost and interest rate
Accessibility to financial institution
Chapter IV: Data9
1. Measuring Firm Size
For variables measuring firm size, finding an appropriate measure of the average builder
size is not easy. A count of all establishments is not acceptable, because not all general
contractors build new units. Among those that do, new constructions will comprise a
varying part of their activities.
I will measure average builder size by the average number of employees per operative
builder that builds structures for sale. The data source is the County Business Pattern1o
from 1987 to 2007 (table 3). It covers 51 states and includes data on employees and
establishment of builders" based on NAICS and SIC classifications.
[Table 3 County Business Pattern data set coverage and industry code summary]
Number of Industry Year Number of Industry
Counties Classification Counties Classification
1987 1547
1988 1520
1989 1468
1990 1433
1991 1398 SIC code
1992 1398 for operative
1993 1470 builders:1530
1994 1481
1995 1492
1996 1542
1997 1791
1998 N/A
1999 N/A
2000 N/A
2001 N/A
2002 N/A
NAICS code include
Operative builders
data in general
contractors
2003 1659
2004 1649 NAICS code
2005 1696 for operative
2006 2213 builders:236117
2007 2184
These dataset is based on number of employees and salaries of each establishment.
9 Summary of data source, year, and geography land of aggregation is shown in attachment 4.
10 Detailed layout of county business pattern dataset is shown in attachment 5.
" New housing operative builders are primarily engaged in building new homes on land that the builder
owns or controls. The land is included with the sale of the home. Establishments in this industry build single
and/or multifamily homes. These establishments are referred to as merchant builders, production, or for-sale
builders.
Therefore, there is issue for disclosure of data which captured as zero or data suppression
flag. To handle this, I exclude zero value, which means there are no operative builders in
that county or the data was not disclosed. Table 4 compares data description with and
without zero value in the 2005 data set. A layout of yearly data is attached. Generally,
establishment number does not show zero value. However, some establishments avoid
revealing data about their employees.
[Table 4 Summary of employment and establishment]
Employment Establishment
All Records Except 'O' All Records
Mean 104 245 15
Std. Dev. 8 18 1
Min 0 1 1
Max 6029 6029 459
Observation 2213 938 2213
In 2005, the mean number of
employees in each of the 2213
counties was 104.
dstribufion of firm rze The distribution of firm size of
45
354 each MSAs which calculated by
6 30
25
20 aggregating counties within
Sr--i MSAs depicted in Graph 5.
7e class The firm size variation is quite
[Graph 5 2005 MSA base number of employees per large. The distribution is right-
establishment distribution.]
skewed, meaning that there is wider size variation among large firms. Around 69% of
establishments are within 0.5 standard deviations from mean firm size and 83% of firms are
within one standard deviation from the mean firm size value. Seventeen percent of firms
are more than one standard deviation from mean value.
2. Measuring Independent Variables
2.1 Measuring Demand
For variables measuring demand, I will use single-family permits to describe aggregate
demand, because they are available for a large cross section of MSAs. Though equilibrium
quantity does not equal demand, the cross-MSA variation in housing permits will reflect
differences across these MSAs in aggregate demand. Changes to the status of buildings
often take place after the permit has been issued. Therefore, as actual equilibrium quantity
between supply and demand, housing starts can be a more accurate measurement. However,
there is no cross-MSA variation in housing starts. In addition, completions can be different
from the number of starts. Based on the Census Bureau's survey on permits, starts, and
completion, starts of single-family units were 2.5% greater than the number of permits. The
number of completions of single-family units was 3.5% less than the number of starts.
Therefore, the actual amount of supply under the assumption of equilibrium is 1.0% less
than the number of permits. Therefore, permits seem not to be biased significantly as a
measurement of market demand.
2.2 Measuring construction cost
Data source is manufacturing, mining and construction statistics' MSA level statistics for
yearly building permits. Because the available permit data is organized at the MSA level, it
is important to manipulate the data with same MSA definitions and corresponding counties.
I focus on the years after 2003 with the 2003 MSA definition by the OMB.
One way to measure construction cost is to use the construction cost index. The index is
based on a sample of single housing units sold or under construction. However,
construction cost indexes have performed poorly, due to the incorrect measurement of labor
costs and a failure to address the endogeneity of construction costs and construction activity.
Therefore, in this research, I will use aggregated construction value in counties.
Construction cost per unit can be calculated by newly added single-family construction
value divided by single-family permit in same data set in Census Bureau. I will focus on
newly added units' reported construction value rather than construction prices in the region.
Because the purpose of this research is to find the elements which affect the spatial
variation of firm size, measurement for construction value which represents regional
difference seems more proper than cost index. Summary statistics are presented below.
[Table 5 Summary statistic of number of permit and construction cost]
Number Average Number of unit Average total construction cost
Year of permitted in each MSAs in each MSAs (in thousands dollars)Year of
3&4MSAs lunit 2unit 5- unit lunit 2unit 3&4 unit 5- unit
unit
2007 364 2258 64 76 928 427239 6461 7296 92981
2005 361 4015 92 110 1003 684998 9032 10294 95135
2003 360 3527 95 100 906 535230 9130 8231 64010
2.3 Measuring Housing Price
For housing price, I use median housing value in census data, Fair Market Rent (FMR) 12
by Department of Housing and Urban Development, and housing price index by federal
housing financial agency. Both fair market rent and housing price index are estimated by
each institution rather than an actual measurement of the market. However, both are
12 Fair Market Rents (FMRs) are used to determine payment standard amounts for the Housing Choice
Voucher program, The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) annually estimates
FMRs for 530 metropolitan areas and 2,045 nonmetropolitan county FMR areas.
adjustable because they have spanned 20 years.
FMR is gross rent estimates at the county level. They include the shelter rent plus the cost
of all tenant-paid utilities, except telephones, cable or satellite television service, and
internet service. FMR estimates are based on two-bedroom units, although there are slight
differences among fiscal years..
(1) (2)* (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Calculate Update to
40h most Compare Calculate
Percentile Current Trend Calculated OtherPercentile ACS Data Utility CPI Utility Add CPI FMRs FMRlt o Bedroom
Base Year Year Component Update Updated Forward State Size FMRs
Rent - Available Components to Mid- Minimum, - Using 2000
using using Shelter Rent CPI Rent Back Point of and use the Census
Census, change Component Update Together Use larger Ratios forCensus, from Base Period value. Locality
RDD Data Yr Factors
[Picture 5 Esatmation of fair market rent based on two-bedroom survey
The summary of data used is below. The number of counties is slightly different from
actual number of counties, especially in 2007. That is because some towns in one county
value are estimated separately. In my analysis, I treated data about multiple towns in one
county as one average data to represent the counties.
[Table 6 Fair market rent of 2003, 2005, and 2007 data set
FMR FMR FMR FMR FMRYear No. of Counties (0 bed) (1 bed) (2 bed) (3 bed) (4 bed)
2003 3183 353 418 519 682 782
2005 3186 410 456 552 720 812
2007 46811s 490 552 669 863 978
The Housing Price Index is a broader measure of the movement of single-family house
13 Borough, Census Area, Municipality
prices. It is an accurate indicator of geographical trends in housing prices. The HPI is a
measure designed to capture changes in the value of single-family homes in the U.S. The
HPI is published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) using data provided by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO), one of FHFA's predecessors, began publishing the HPI in the fourth quarter of
1995. I used all transaction indexes based on the seasonally unadjusted MSA. It is a
quarterly index and the percentage change in home values relative to the same quarter one
year earlier. I set the last fourth quarter as standard to see the housing value changes. From
2003 to 2007, average housing price of 350 MSA increased 141%, 182%, and 200% each,
relative to the previous year.
2.4 Measuring land supply and land assembly effect
There were no explicit measures of the supply of land for development. Instead, we use
variables that measure the total amount of land that can be readily developed and the extent
to which land assembly is likely to be a problem. Farm and ranch land and MSA should be
a rough measure of the supply of land that can be developed into lots for residential
construction. Agricultural data on farm and ranch land in an MSA describes the supply of
land suitable for development.
While all MSAs have undeveloped land on the outskirts of the urban area, much of this
land can be costly to develop because of topography, the presence of wetlands or bodies of
water or because the land has been dedicated to some other use.
Other variables measuring land supply are the likelihood of land assembly. If the parcel is
highly fragmented, the process of acquiring the land will be more difficult. If the farms are
owned by a single household or firm, the expected probability of land assembly available
for development will rise. We can infer that given supply of land area, indicated as a
percentage of farm area normalized by whole land area, if the number of farms increases,
lands are more fragmented. Therefore, using percentage of farm land and number of farms
in MSAs, we could measure the impact of fragmentation and the amount of developable
land to firm size. The data source are the 2002 and 2007 county censuses of agriculture.
Number [Table 7 Developable land area and
Number of of Farmland fragmentation of land, 2002 and 2007]
Year counties farms (acres)
2002 3078 692 301496
2007 3078 717 296697
2.5 Measuring Financial Cost and Accessibility
For financial accessibility, it is hard to get the direct data, because most of the data is
classified. Previous studies used the data of publicly traded companies. However, operative
builders are medium or small size, and are not on the stock market. First, I used mortgage
rates and mortgage costs over regions as indicators of the difference in financial markets. I
also use an indirect way of finding financial accessibility, based on the assumption that
national financial markets do not spread their costs across the nation. On that basis, I use
quantitative amount of financial institute which can be critical to financing construction. In
this case, I used number of establishment of investment banking and securities which are
normalized by total number of financial establishments in each MSA (NAICS code: 523110
(investment banking), 52: financial establishment).
I choose investment banking and securities as indicators of financial market activity,
because I assumed that they showed a wider spread of return than the interest rate.
3. Measuring Regulatory Stringency
For variables measuring regulation, I will use the Wharton Urban Decentralization Project
(WUDP) data set which includes results from a survey of local planners in MSAs. Data
explain the regulatory environment such as the estimated number of months between an
application for rezoning and the receipt of building permits. I will include measures of
regulation, including the estimated number of months required for subdivision approval, the
ways in which growth management techniques have been introduced in the MSA, and
whether development or impact fees have been imposed in the cities in the MSA. In the
survey, time for subdivision approval is a categorical variable for the estimated number of
months until approvals are obtained to subdivide a properly zoned property of given size
for residential development.
The data source is 2007 the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI). It
covers 2729 records from each type of jurisdiction's response to survey 4: 51 states, 319
MSA/PMSAsl5, 2729 places (730 unknown MSA/PMSAs, 1999 places in 319 known
MSA/PMSAs). The simple jurisdiction statistics is indicated in table 8. Not every record is
distributed equally over upper jurisdiction level. All data layouts with simple statistical
descriptions are attached.
14 Each questionnaire's specification and summary statistics are shown in attachment 6 and 7.
15 Metropolitan areas are based on 1999 boundaries, and primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs)
within a consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA) are considered distinct areas.
[Table 8 Summary ofjurisdictions in Wharton regulatory data set]
Max of No. of MSA/PMSAs
25 (California)in one State
Min of No. of MSA/PMSAs 1 (Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Rhode
in one State Island, Vermont, Wyoming)
Max of No. of Places 100 (Chicago, IL PMSA)
in one MSA/PMSA
Min of No. of MSA/PMSAs 1 (Kankakee, IL PMSA et all, 71 MSA/PMSAs)
in one State
WRLURI is using fifteen specific questions with a complete copy of the survey. The overall
response rate was 38%, with 2,649 surveys returned, representing 60% of the population
surveyed. It creates a series of sub-indexes that summarize different aspects of the diverse
landscape characterizing the local regulatory environment as below16 .
The Local Political
Pressure Index (LPPI)
The State Political
Involvement Index
(SPII)
The State Court
Involvement Index
(SCII)
It reflects the degree of involvement by various local actors in the
development process. It is a standardardized variable with a mean
of zero and standard deviation of one.
It is formed as the standardized sum of two components ranked by
surveyors. The first is based on the fifty state profiles of state-level
legislative and executive branch activity pertaining to land use
regulation. It is ranking of 1, 2, and 3. A score of 1 indicates that
there had been little recent activity towards fostering such
restrictions, with a 3 indicating that state government has exhibited
a high level of activity, not only studying the issue via commissions
and like, but acting on it with laws or executive orders. A score of 2
was achieved if a state was in between dormancy and intense
activity on land use issues. The second component of this subindex
is based on the answers to the survey question on 'how involved is
the state legislature in affecting residential building activities and/or
growth management procedures'. The answers take on values from
1 to 5, with a higher score indicating a greater role and influence
for the state legislature. Lower values of this index imply less
activity towards more general state land use control.
The judicial environment was assessed based on the tendency of
appellate courts to uphold or restrain municipal land-use
regulations. The judicial environment was assessed based on the
16 Components and equation for each sub index are shown attachment 8.
Local Zoning Approval
Index (LZAI)
Local Project Approval
Index (LPAI)
Local Assembly Index
(LAI)
Supply Restrictions
Index (SRI)
Density Restrictions
Index (DRI)
Open Space Index (OSI)
Exactions Index (EI)
Approval Delay Index
tendency of appellate courts to uphold or restrain four types of
municipal land-use regulations -- impact fees and exactions, fair
share development requirements, building moratoria, and spot or
exclusionary zoning. The state score here reflects the degree of
deference to municipal control, with a score of 1 implying that the
courts have been highly restrictive regarding its localities' use of
these particular municipal land-use tools. On the other end of the
spectrum, a score of 3 is given if the courts have been strongly
supportive of municipal regulation. A score of 2 is given if the
courts have been neither highly restrictive nor highly supportive of
municipal regulation.
The LZAI is the simple sum of the number of entities whose
approval is required.
This sub index value is the simple sum of the number of
organizations that must approve a project that does not need any
change to current zoning.
The Local Assembly Index is a measure of direct democracy and
captures whether there is a community meeting or assembly before
which any zoning or rezoning request must be presented and voted
up or down. This subindex takes on a value of one if the
community both has a regular town meeting and a requirement for
a popular vote in order to approve changes to zoning regulations,
and is zero otherwise.
The Supply Restrictions Index (SRI) reflects the extent to which
there are explicit constraints or caps on supplying new units to the
market. The SRI is the simple sum of the number of 'yes' answers
to each of these questions.
It reflects if communities clearly care about (low) density. DRI= 1 if
the locality has at least a one acre minimum lot size requirement
somewhere withing its jurisdiction and a zero if it has not.
It reflects whether home builders in the community are subject to
open space requirements or have to pay fees in lieu of such
dedications. OSI=I if the community imposes such regulation and
equals zero otherwise.
This index is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if
exactions for associated infrastructure improvements are mandated
by the locality and is zero otherwise. EI=I if developers must pay
allocable shares of infrastructure improvement costs and is zero
otherwise.
This subindex can be interpreted as the average time lag in months
(ADI) and is calculated. Survey asked respondents about the average
duration of the review process, the typical amount of time between
application for rezoning and issuance of a building permit for
hypothetical projects, and the typical amount of time between
application for subdivision approval and the issuance of a building
permit conditional on proper zoning being in place. More
specifically, respondents were asked to reply to the first of these
three questions with the number of months for the review process.
The latter two questions provided ranges of possible answers (also
in months) and the midpoint of the relevant interval to reflect the
expected delay is used. In addition, the answers is averaged across
the three hypothetical projects described in the questions: a
relatively small, single-family project involving fewer than 50
units; a larger single-family development with more than 50 units,
and a multifamily project of indeterminate size.
WRLURI Overall measurement of regulatory environment as a linear
combination of the sub-indexes.
Using each characterized sub indexes, it created overall regulatory environment index, as
noted WRLURI. Detailed components of index are attached. Factor analysis of the sub-
indexes is employed to create the WRLURI. The factor loadings are the weights that are
used when multiplying by each of the standardized component indexes to obtain the
WRLURI as a linear combination of the sub indexes.
Table 9 is summary statistics of sub indexes and correlation with WRLRI. The correlations
of WRLURI with the component indexes provide a sense of what information contained in
the sub indexes did or did not 'make it through' to the WRLURI. The WRLRI is very
highly correlated with the Average Delay Index (ADI), but also clearly is being influenced
by many other components. The aggregate index loads positively on nine of the eleven sub
indexes. It loads most heavily on the Average Delay Index (ADI), with the state and local
political involvement indexes (SPII and LPII) also being relatively influential. The
Exactions Index (EI), the State Courts Involvement Index (SCII), and the Local Zoning
Approval Index (LZAI) have very small factor loadings, with the latter being very slightly
negative.
[Table 9 Summary statistic of components of factor loading regulatory measurement]
Correlation withFactor Loadings Correlation with Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
WRLURI
ADI 0.3 0.73 2678 5.61 3.90 -0.62 29.39
LPPI 0.22 0.56 2729 0.02 1.01 -1.85 7.49
SPII 0.22 0.57 2728 0.01 0.99 -2.16 2.42
DRI 0.19 0.53 2729 0.22 0.41 0 1
LPAI 0.15 0.37 2718 1.56 1.03 0 6
OSI 0.14 0.38 2660 0.55 0.50 0 1
LAI 0.14 0.32 2729 0.03 0.18 0 1
SRI 0.09 0.25 2714 0.20 0.84 0 6
El 0.02 0.05 2659 0.75 0.43 0 1
SCII -0.03 -0.18 2728 2.13 0.67 1 3
LZAI -0.04 -0.1 2728 2.04 0.91 0 6
3.1 Interpretation of regulatory index
Besides WRLRI is constructed to rank localities in terms of the degree or overall strictness
of the land use regulatory environment, the above sub indexes averages allow us to say
about the typical land use regulatory environment in sample.
Firstly, mean value of LZAI of '2.04' (the simple sum of the number of entities whose
approval is required) shows that two entities, be they a zoning commission, city council, or
environmental review board, are required to approve any project requiring a zoning change
Secondly, mean value of LPAI of '1.56' (the simple sum of the number of organizations
that must approve a project that does not need any change to current zoning) shows that
more than one entity also is required to approve any project, even if it does not involve a
zoning change;
Thirdly, the very low mean values of both LPPI of '0.02' (the degree of involvement by
various local actors in the development process) and LAI of '0.03' a measure of public
participation and captures whether there is a community meeting or assembly before which
any zoning or rezoning request must be presented and voted up or down). It is highly
unlikely that any form of direct democracy is practiced in which land use issues and
projects must be put to a popular vote.
Fourth, the mean value for DRI of 0.22 (the degree of density restriction) seems that there
probably is no onerous density restriction such as a one acre lot size minimum anywhere in
the community, although some less stringent minimum constraint generally is in place.
Fifth, 0.55 and 0.75 for each mean value of exactions and open space requirement shows
that there exist probably, even though they are not as omnipresent as is the case in the more
highly-regulated places Lastly, 5.61 ADI (delay index in month) shows that there is about a
six month lag (on average) between the submission of an application for a permit and
permit issuance for a standard project.
Table 10 reports summary statistics on the distribution of the WRLURI as indicator for
whole strictness of localities.
[Table 10 WRLURI summary statistics]
WRLURI classification Full Sample Metro Area Non-Metro Area Sample
Mean 0 0.17 -0.46
Standard Deviation 1 1 0.86
10th percentile -1.18 -1.03 -1.42
25th percentile -0.72 -0.55 -1.1
50th percentile -0.1 0.06 -0.56
75th percentile 0.59 0.74 0
90th percentile 1.29 1.5 0.6
No. of Observations 2,611 1,904 707
The first column uses the full national. There are 2,611 communities in this sample, 73
percent (or 1,904) of which are in metropolitan areas as defined by the Bureau of the
Census. By construction, the mean of this index is zero and the standard deviation is one.
The second columns report index values at the mean and across the distribution of
communities within metropolitan areas. The average community within a metropolitan area
with mean value of 0.17 is more regulated than the average community in the nation which
is set as zero. This suggests there could be fairly large gap in the degree of regulation
between places in metropolitan areas and those outside them. And the 707 jurisdictions
outside of metropolitan areas have measures of regulatory strictness that are less than the
national average.
The WRLURI shows the regulatory climate in central cities tends to be less strict according
to our data. The mean WRLURI value for central cities in sample is -0.14, with the median
being -0.25. There is considerable heterogeneity across central cities, but they have a less
restrictive land use regulatory environment on average than their suburbs. The gap between
their mean and that for the suburbs is about one-third of a standard deviation.
3.2 Spatial variation of regulatory stringency
The data of Wharton survey shows the spatial variation of regulatory environment. Their
analysis showed that the places whose regulatory strictness indicated by WRLURI quite
close to mean value distribute over national wide. They pick up 164 communities whose
WRLURI values are within 1/10th of a standard deviation of the metropolitan area mean of
0.14 (i.e., 0.05<WRLURI<0.24, given the mean of WRLURI=0.14 in the metropolitan area
sample; above Table). These places are not concentrated in only a few states or areas.
Rather, they span 30 states and 89 metropolitan areas. Given the narrowness of definition of
average (within 1/10th of standard deviation), this means a lot of geographic variation, and
emphasizes the point that 'average' places in terms of land use regulatory strictness are
spread throughout much of the nation. Below table reports more detailed providence about
spatial variation showed above.
[Table 11 Summary Statistic of sub index]
Means
164 Communities within
1/10 t" standard deviation Full Metro Sample
from mean WRLURI (n= 1,904)
Sub indexes
Local Political Pressure Index (LPPI) -0.03 0.11
State Political Involvement Index (SPII) 0.27 0.05
State Court Involvement Index (SCII) 2 2.04
Local Zoning Approval Index (LZAI) 1.94 2.04
Local Project Approval Index (LPAI) 1.73 1.64
Local Assembly Index (LAI) 0 0.03
Supply Restrictions Index (SRI) 0.19 0.23
Density Restrictions Index (DRI) 0.16 0.26
Open Space Index (OSI) 0.72 0.6
Exactions Index (EI) 0.73 0.75
Approval Delay Index (ADI) 6.03 6.09
Local Traits
Median Family Income (2000) $57,486 $57,610
Median House Value (2000) $136,017 $136,790
Percent College Graduates (2000) 22.40% 24.30%
Percent Poverty (2000) 6.10% 6.50%
Percent White (2000) 79.40% 81.00%
Population (2000) 27,283 27,924
Land Area in Square Miles (2000) 14.8 17.9
Density, Population per Square Mile (2000) 2,545 2,211
The values of the eleven component indexes for these 164 places (column 1) allow us to
compare them to the average values for the metropolitan area sample (column 2). The mean
values of the subcomponents of our sub index tend to be quite close to the metropolitan
area means. The same is true for the income, house value, and demographic variables
reported in the bottom panel of this table. Thus, there does not appear to be anything that is
special or abnormal about places that have the typical land use regulatory environment in
the country. Therefore, we can verify that the normal mean places with traits above
distributed over nation very widely.
4. Data Processing
4.1 Matching each data set using geographical reference
Not all data is organized in the same way. For example, regulatory indexes are based on
place level; permits and price variables are based on MSA, and other datasets are based on
county level. 17 Moreover, the definition of MSA has changed, and this makes data
operation difficult. However, the most accurate and consistent level of geographic reference
is county level FIPS code over 20 years. Therefore, I set the county Fips code as standard to
manipulate the data's geographical reference, linking place codes to county level.
First, transferring place FIPS code to county FIPS code which includes the places is
operated, with care attention. I proceeded with data based on counties. I created new
records for regulatory place base records by aggregated place data within same counties.
[Table 12 Summary of place records linking to county level]
Number of place records 1245
Average number of places in one county 4.448996
Median number of places in one county 2
Max number of places in one county 102
Min number of places in one county 1
The data set summary about
jurisdiction indicating number of
counties in each MSAs is shown in
17 Detailed information about each geographical land of aggregation is shown in attachment 4.
table 12. Each county has a different number of survey responses about land use regulation.
The number of aggregated places records in counties is scattered. However, I used
aggregated value, excluding all null values. MSA and county matching process is done as
above, using the 2003 MSA definition. 18 There is no way to be accurate so I tried not to
use the data using other MSA definition. It is hard to say that transforming the previous
definition of PMSA/MSA to the one used by MSA and CSA after 2003 could be reliable.
However, OMB's reference can make those transforming process enable in some extent of
correctness.
Through matching process, the initial 1696 counties of 2005 were converted to 140 MSAs
which include all variables used in regression models. First, 1696 counties' outlier which
has zero value for employees is excluded, resulting in 559 counties. These counties are
aggregated in MSA level with 309 records for firm size, 361 records for permit and
construction costs, 921 farms and demographics data, 384 records for housing price index,
414 records for finance data, and 605 regulation data. Among these records, common MSA
including all variables value is 140 MSAs.' 9
4.2 Simultaneity and Multi co-linearity bias among variables
Picture 4 shows the range of covering variables. The issues in handling the dataset are
simultaneity between independent and dependent variables and multi co-linearity among
dependent variables. For example, if there are effects of builder size on levels of new home
18 Detailed operation process exemplified by 2005 data base is shown in attachment 9.
19 Detailed variables for each record in Access data base are shown in attachment 10. And summary statistics
of each dataset is shown in attachment 11.
construction, then the coefficient on permits in Equation 2 in Picture 5 will suffer from
simultaneity bias. Similar problem can happen in Equation 3 with construction cost, 5 with
housing stock and 7 with housing price index and housing value. In this case, the reverse
causality or effect of builder size to dependent variables can lead to overestimations or
underestimations of the elasticity of explanatory variables effect. One method of handling
this is to use instruments for permits to control this simultaneity, using two-stage least
square IV methods.20
However, this research focuses on how each variable affects industrial organization in the
long run. In the long run, the housing supply is stabilized under fixed number of
establishments with variations in firm size. Therefore, I will limit this thesis to long-run
variations in organizational structure. However, the problem of multi collinearity is handled
because it reduces the explanatory power of the dependent variables. This thesis reveals
many aspects' independent effect on firm size. Therefore, if the correlation among
dependent variables is relatively high, these variables are treated or substituted to sustain
the independency among explanatory variables. Therefore, the analysis will be based on
correlation tests among variables before the regression.
20 Interpretation as two-stage least squares: In the first stage, each endogenous covariate in the equation of
interest is regressed on all of the exogenous variables in the model, including both exogenous covariates in
the equation of interest and the excluded instruments. The predicted values from these regressions are
obtained.
Stage 1: Regress each column of X on Z, (X = Zp + errors) and save the predicted values:
3= (Z'Z)-'Z'X Therefore: X = PzX.
In the second stage, the regression of interest is estimated as usual, except that in this stage each endogenous
covariate is replaced with the predicted values from its first stage model from the first stage.
Stage 2: Regress Y on the predicted values from the first stage:
Y = X3 + noise.
The resulting estimator of P is numerically identical to the expression displayed above. A small correction
must be made to the sum-of-squared residuals in the second-stage fitted model in order that the covariance
matrix of p is calculated correctly
Chapter V: Analysis of the variables
1. Firm size variation and spatial distribution
The map below21 shows the spatial distribution of builders' size with number of the
employees per establishment based on 2216 counties in 2003. Although there was little
variation of firm size over 20 years, the cross-sectional regional difference in firm size is
dramatic. However, there seems some correlation between firm size and county area. For
this reason, more detailed analysis is needed of the normalization of area to see a more
accurate regional spatial variation.
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[Picture 6 Distribution of firm size based on county boundary, 2005]
Based on the 2005 county level comparison, the highest average number of employees per
operative builder was 212.3 in Kenton County of Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN
Metropolitan Statistical Area; 28722 counties' mean value is 14.3 per establishment. The
21 Null points are counties where one of four data sources is not captured. However, each variable, especially
Wharton survey which is not available at the county level, can be presented separately, using latitude and
longitude of each surveyed places which is linked by populated places code.
22 The number of counties is based on County Business Pattern's classification. For the 2005 dataset, 559
counties showed non-zero value for employees among 1696 counties which have operative builders' data.
And 287 counties showed all record during 20 years from 1985 to 1995. To see the growth rate and size
distribution, I set these 287 counties as those which have valid and reliable counties which have employees
and establishment data.
growth rate of firm size from 1995 to 2005 ranged from a high of 920% (Loudoun County
in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metropolitan Statistical Area) to a
low of -87% (Lake County in Orlando, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area).
[Table 13 County Base average number of employees per establishment summary]
2005 size 1995 size 1986 size Asize(05-95) Asize(95-86) Asize(05-86)
Mean 14.3 8.8 8.9 87% 24% 91%
deviation 17.07 8.37 6.82 1.53 1.41 2.19
count 287 287 287 287 287 287
[Table 14 2005 counties' average number of employees per establishment]
Size max 212.3 Kenton County of Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN MetropolitanStatistical Area
Growth 920% Loudoun County in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
max Metropolitan Statistical Area
Growth -87% Lake County in Orlando, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area
min
This firm size variation is clearer when we see nationwide regional comparisons. The
below graph shows the average number of employees per establishment based on simple
aggregate number of MSAs of each region for 2007 and 2003 data23
16.00 The South and West showed bigger
14.00
12.00 builder size and faster growth than
10.00
8.00
.002003 the Northeast and Midwest.
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[Graph 6 Regional comparison of firm size of 2007 variation. The different environment
and 2003]
of each region can reveal the determinants of regional differences in firm size.
23 Five hundred and fifteen MSAs for 2007 and 285 MSAs for 2003 are included for average number for each
region. Both are based on 2003 MSA definition by Office and Management Budget.
2. Regulatory environment variation by region
There is also wide variation among regions. Below is showing regulatory environments
strictness based on Wharton survey index. It includes all places surveyed rather than the
county or MSA definition, because the Wharton survey is not available at the county level.
It uses the latitude and longitude of each surveyed place, and these are linked by populated
places code. This picture allows us to contrast places across the full distribution of
WRLURI values. I divide the sample into three groups: lightly, moderately, and heavily
regulated places. Lightly-regulated places are in the bottom quartile of WRLURI values
(WRLURI<-0.55 in this case); moderately-regulated places span the inter-quartile range of
the data (-0.55<WRLURI<0.74); and highly-regulated places are those with WRLURI
index values above 0.74 which is the top quartile.
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[Picture 7. WRLURI distribution based on place level]
Below is the average subindex values for each group, with the bottom panel providing
community income, house value and demographic descriptors based on Census 2000.
[Table 15 Sub index table with its demographic features]
Means
Lightly-Regulated Average-Regulated Highly-Regulated
WRLURI < -0.55 -0.55<WRLURI<0.74 WRLURI > 0.74
(n=476) (n=952) (n=476)
The Eleven Subindexes
Local Political Pressure Index (LPPI) -0.46 0.07 0.93
State Political Involvement Index (SPII) -0.68 0.17 0.74
State Court Involvement Index (SCII) 2.15 2.04 2.03
Local Zoning Approval Index (LZAI) 2.13 1.99 1.91
Local Project Approval Index (LPAI) 1.16 1.67 1.99
Local Assembly Index (LAI) 0 0.002 0.12
Supply Restrictions Index (SRI) 0.03 0.18 0.53
Density Restrictions Index (DRI) 0.04 0.18 0.57
Open Space Index (OSI) 0.26 0.68 0.75
Exactions Index (EI) 0.66 0.79 0.75
Approval Delay Index (ADI) 3.2 5.7 10.5
Local Traits
Median Family Income (2000) $50,742 $58,641 $72,576
Median House Value (2000) $110,926 $150,576 $216,748
Percent College Graduates (2000) 23.60% 27.00% 35.40%
Percent Poverty (2000) 8.50% 7.00% 4.80%
Percent White (2000) 78.60% 76.90% 81.10%
Population (2000) 62,760 43,408 51,567
Land Area in Square Miles (2000) 21 18.4 31.1
Density, Population per Square Mile (2000) 2,599 2,886 2,046
The differences between lightly- and highly-regulated places are fairly large for most of the
subindexes making up the WRLURI. The only exceptions are the State Court Involvement
Index (SCII) and the Local Zoning Approval Index (LZAI). The results for the Local
Project Approval Index (LPAI, row 5) indicate that highly-regulated places tend to have
about one more entity that is required to approve a project, even if that project does not
require a zoning change. Having multiple approval (and, thus, rejection) points must make
the regulatory environment more burdensome for those wanting to supply new product to
the market.
There literally are no lightly-regulated places with direct democracy requirements that
zoning changes have to approved by popular vote at an announced meeting (LAI=0.00).
While this type of requirement is relatively rare throughout the sample, 12 percent of the
highly regulated places have it, and they are concentrated in three states-Massachusetts,
Maine, and New Hampshire. We would expect it to be easier to block projects in such
situations. There also are very few explicit restrictions on new supply in communities, but
those who have them are much more likely to be in the top quartile of the WRLURI
distribution as indicated by the results in the next row for the Supply Restrictions Index
(SRI). Density restrictions as reflected in one acre minimum lot sizes are more widespread,
but they still are much more heavily concentrated in places that are highly restrictive on
average. The data in row 8 show that 57 percent of the most highly regulated places have a
one acre minimum lot size requirement in at least one neighborhood, while only 4 percent
of the most lightly regulated places have such a minimum.
Open space requirements are even more omnipresent, but there still is a meaningful gap
between highly- and lightly-regulated places. Seventy-seven percent of the top quartile of
the WRLURI distribution has an open space requirement (i.e., OSI=I) versus only 26
percent of the bottom quartile of the WRLURI distribution. Even with respect to exactions,
which are the most widespread local regulatory feature, there is a difference across highly-
versus lightly-regulated places. Seventy-five percent of the former have some type of
exactions requirement (i.e., EI=I) versus only 66 percent for the bottom quartile of the most
lightly-regulated communities. Finally, the average project delay time is more than three
times longer in the highly-regulated places versus the most lightly-regulated places. More
specifically, the Approval Delay Index (ADI) indicates a mean delay of 10.5 months in the
more regulated areas versus 3.2 months in the less regulated areas.
In sum, highly regulated places tend to be so almost across the board. The top quartile of
places in terms of WRLURI values tends to be communities with more intensely involved
local political environments relating to land use regulation. They also tend to be in states
whose executive and legislative branches are facilitating the adoption of statewide land use
rules. However, their courts may or may not be adding to this process. Highly regulated
places also tend to have multiple veto points for project approval, although there is no
apparent difference in this dimension for project-level zoning approval. Direct democracy
in terms of requiring a popular vote for zoning changes is almost exclusively a
characteristic of highly-regulated places. And, the most highly-regulated quarter of the
metropolitan sample is disproportionately likely to have some type of formal restriction on
new supply, a relatively onerous one acre lot size minimum, as well as open space and
exaction requirements. Finally, these places have by far the highest average project delay
times.
The bottom panel of Table 14 documents that highly-regulated places also are richer, much
more highly educated, and have substantially higher house values than the most lightly-
regulated places in terms the WRLURI distribution. Median family income is more than
$20,000 greater in the most highly-regulated prices and has a simple correlation coefficient
of 0.35 with our regulation index. Median house value in highly regulated places is nearly
double that in lightly-regulated places and has a 0.33 correlation with WRLURI. The 12
percentage point gap in the fraction of households headed by college graduates is quite
large considering the sample average is 28 percent. Its simple correlation with the degree of
local land use regulation is 28 percent. The most highly-regulated areas by our measure
have a greater fraction of white households, but the difference with the most lightly-
regulated areas is modest.
The same holds for average population across these places. However, the most highly-
regulated areas are physically larger and they are a 25 percent less dense. The density result
is strongly suggestive. If regulation were being driven primarily by the fact that places
literally were running out of land, then we would expect the most highly regulated places to
be the densest. That the reverse is true strongly suggests that this is not a primary
motivation for more intense regulation in many places.
3. Correlation Test between firm size and regional character
3.1 Firm size
I tested the average number of employees per establishment. For convenience, black cells
have a positive correlation and white cells have a negative one in table 16. Grey cells mean
that there is no correlation between regulation and firm size. I tested each level of firm size
and choose the correlation value which show consistent signage with each class of dataset.
First, population and housing unit show high correlation with firm size as of 35-36%. A
large population means a large number of employees regardless of the number of
establishments. Geographic components like land area and density do not show a
meaningful correlation. The housing market indicators like occupation rate or vacancy rate
show high correlation with firm size as of 36%. The occupancy rate seems reasonable
because it is directly related to market demand. High correlation of firm size with vacancy
rate seems controversial to one with occupancy rate. However, the demand in the market
shows the amount of existing stock, whether occupied or not. Rental market factors impact
to firm size is interesting and needed more research further. Rental or owner-occupied
units are also highly correlated with firm size.
[Table 16 Correlation test of firm size with dem hic factors of MSAs]
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 7 I 8 1K 1 0
Emp all 35% 37% 2% 0% 62% 11% 36% 36% 17% 26%Emp>0 25% 26% 5% 1% 5% 6% 6% 26% 24% 8% 16%Emp>10 23% 24% 4% 0% 4% 5% 4% 24% 24% 8% 16%Emp>15 21% 21% 2% -1% 3% 4% 3% 21% 22% 6% 15%
MAX 35% 37% 5% 1% 5% 12% 11% 36% 36% 17% 26%MIAX FALSE
12 13 14 15 1 6 17 .18 9 .. 20 21 I 22
-12. 
-13% -11% 40% 30% 13% -22% -7% -27% -16% 6%-1% -13% -6 29/ 21% 11% -18% 2% -15% 
-23% 11%
-11% 
-6% 
-5% 26/% 19% 11% 
-14% 2% 
-11% 
-21% 8%-10% -5% -4% 24% 17% 10%o 
-12% 2% -8% 
-20% 8%-9% -5% -4% 24% 17% 
-12% 2% -8% -16% 11%-9% -5% -4% 40% 30% 13% -12% 2% FALSE
-5% 31% 7% 18% 19/o 16% -19% 34% 34%4%
-2% 28% 8% 18% 21% 16% -24% 22%0  21% 24% 22%
-2% 25% 7% 18% 20% 16% -22% 18% 17% 20% 18%-1% 23% 7% 17% 18% 15% 
-21% 15% 14% 17% 16%o1% 
  17  1 % 
34% 36% 34%
-1% 31% 8% 18% 21% 16% -19% 34% 34% 36% 34%
S 34 1 3 5 36 3 7 38 39 4 0 4 1 42 43 4440% -14% -12% -20% -13% 27% 38% 25 42% 42 16%300/% 
-3% 0% -14% 
-2% 15% 24% 16% 300/ 30% 16%2630% -1% 1% 
-11% 0% 11% 190/ 12% 25% 24% 15%22% 0% 3% 
-9% 2% 8% 15% 9% 21% 21% 13%40% 0% 3% 
-9% 2% 27% 38% 25% 442% 42% 16%
I FALSE FALSE I = FALSE
Racial aspects seem high in relation to firm size. High ratio of white is negatively related to
firm size and mixed treats of races show high correlation with firm size. Income level and
housing value components show a high positive correlation with firm size.
24 Each number is indexed with census variables; the list of variables is shown in attachment 12.
-- ~--~-----
v
I III I. I R1 I. I - ..
3.2 Effect of Disequilibrium in market on firm size.
Based on literature review, demand and supply determine the equilibrium of price and stock
of homebuilding. Within this equilibrium, average firm size in the market is determined.
The dynamics of this process are ambiguous. However, there are variations of price and
firm size in different market structures, which are useful when searching for the
determinants of firm size.
Based on the literature, we can assume that disequilibrium in market and regulatory
influence are more critical determinants of firm size than are aggregated demand and
regulation which are treated as supply costs. Therefore, we can test those disequilibrium
factors' influence on firm size.
First, the rent growth rate is an indicator of the market's dynamic to find an equilibrium
price level. Therefore, if rents increase or decrease more rapidly than elsewhere, there is a
market clearing process, responding to a demand or supply shock in the market. To test the
simple relationship between rent growth rate and firm size, I picked firm size. I tested all
records including null value and compared them to the correlation value based on records
which did not have null value. I then test only large firm with rent growth rate which have
more than five and ten employees separately. I expected a correlation with firm size.
However, the correlation between firm size and rent growth rate shows little value. The rent
and price of housing market lead co-linearity. I focus on price and housing price index
rather than rent and rent growth, since rent level could not explain firm size.
Second, regulatory variables also tested with firm size. Table 17 depicts the correlation of
each variable in Wharton survey with firm size. A summary of each regulatory variable is
attached.
[Table 17 Correlation between firm size and rent]
Firm size: Correlation with percentage of average rent growth,based on aggregated value of places within oneWhose employees per establishment is
county
no less than 10 15.5%
no less than 5 2.5%
greater than 0 10.3%
With all records 2.6%
I tested all components of the sub index with firm size as I did with rent growth. The black
cell means a positive correlation and white one is a negative one. The other grey cell means
that there is no correlation between regulation and firm size. The ranking is shown in Table
1826
[Table 18 Correlation test result]
Correlation Variables Name Regulations which act as
18% Local council involvement in regulation
cost factor for a
17% Open space index(OSI)
17% Impact fees/exactions importance(single-family) development project
16% Impact fees/exactions importance(multi family)
16% Council opposition importance(multi family)
13% Council opposition importance(single-family) showed a high correlation:
13% num. of units in multi family dwelling limit
12% multi family dwelling limit regulation about extraction
12% <=.5 acre minlotsize requirement fee and open space
endowment. Regulations affecting the approval process which is a direct cost to project
show a high level of correlation. Therefore, the regulation which induces direct cost to
development shows a high positive correlation, meaning that those regulations allow
builders to grow, and to be more resistant to the cost effect of regulation.
25 % growth rate of FMR = 1 4 FMR_Q, 
-
6 All components of regulatory index FMResults are shown in attachment 13.26 All components of regulatory index results are shown in attachment 13.
m Results Summary n
First, although there was little variation of firm size over 20 years, the cross-sectional
difference in firm size over region is dramatic. One standard deviation of mean size of
establishments is an average of 97% over 287 MSA regions.
Second, intensity of land use regulatory stringency requires a popular vote for zoning
changes, and formal restriction such as density control on new supply and project delay
times. Jurisdiction structure does not characterize highly regulated places.
The results of the correlation with the firm size are below.
* Population and housing unit
with correlation of 35-36%.
* Occupation rate or vacancy rate
with correlation of 36-40%
* Ratio of white in racial component
with negative correlation of with 23-31%.
* Income level and housing value
with correlation of 32-45%
* Cost factor for development project:
- extraction fee
- open space endowment.
- delayed month in approval
* Geographic components like land area and
density
* Rent growth rate
* Overall regulatory stringency index
* Community control and discretion
* Jurisdiction structure
The variation is not explained well withThe variation is explained with
--
Chapter VI: Results and Analysis
1. Refining Somerville's model
I chose the 2005 data set, because the regulatory variables are based on a 2005 survey. As
indicated above, the total number of observations used to refine is 140 MSAs 27. The
result is shown in Table 20. As a first step, a previous Somerville's regression model
indicated Model 0 is used as a starting point for the most recent data. Financial components,
construction costs and housing values are added in Model 2, 3, and 4.
[Table 19 Regression Summary table to refine previous model]
Variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -2.941 -1.200 -0.533 -0.284 -4.713
(-0.603) (-1.293) (-0.168) (-0.1) (-2.029)
In() 0.412
Permit (4.921)
In(O 0.366 0.400 0.293 0.428
Permit/Housing Unit (3.307) (3.440) (3.5) (3.893)
In(_ 0.448 0.378 0.850 0.338
Housing unit (4.731) (2.318) (7.9) (4.819)
In()_ -0.194 -0.226 -0.207 -0.372
Farm(No) (-1.523) (-1.648) (-1.510) (-1.5)
InO(_ 0.253 0.288 0.328 0.321 0.241
Farm(% acre) (2.358) (2.472) (2.742) (3.3) (2.838)
In- -0.242
Mortgage cost (-0.460)
In_ 0.066
No. IV Est. per No. of Financial Est. (0.679)
In- 0.229
Construction Cost (1.5)
In- 0.421
median Housing Value (2.010)
Adj. R2 0.254 0.268 0.252 0.318 0.274
F 7.918 9.951 15.324 15.0 5.492
Obs. 140 140 140 140 140
* All models independent variables are log form of firm size(number of employment per number of establishments)
27 Detailed data process about number of data and data description is attached
Model I added 'demand' and 'market size' to model 0. 'Demand' represents the number
of permits that were normalized by total housing unit, meaning the ratio of newly added
housing units to existing stock. Intuitively, it can be easily inferred that MSA area is
correlated with homebuilders' size, shown in table 21.
[Table 20 Correlation test in model 0]
Permit Farm No % farm MSA area MSA, area and number of permits
Permit 1
Farm No 0.49 1 all showed high correlations of
% farm -0.17 0.23 1
MSA area 0.69 0.46 -0.10 1
around 70%, indicating the
possibility of multi co-linearity. Other variables showed independency from one another.
Therefore, it seems necessary to normalize the market activity with market size. I
normalized 'permit' with 'total number of housing units in MSAs,' which showed the
newly added stock ratio over existing market size. I measured the total housing unit number
as a function of market size. 'Housing unit' is added to measure market size.
In Model 0, land area was measured by the whole MSA area rather than only the land part.
The correlation between the MSA area and the number of farms or the number of permits
showed a high value of 0.49 and 0.69 each. In model 1, I extracted the water area from the
MSA area for measuring only land area. Also, the percent acreage of farm area to MSA
area could be refined with 'land area of MSA' which includes bodies of water. With refined
data, the correlation table is as below. It showed more independency among variables,
resolving the co-linearity problem between market activity and MSA geographic size
shown in table 22.
[Table 21 Correlation test in Model 1]
Housing unit Permit/stock Farm No % farm MSA Land area
Housing unit 1
Permit/stock -0.12 1
Farm No 0.47 -0.11 1
% farm(land) -0.16 -0.17 0.21 1
MSA Land area 0.42 0.11 0.46 -0.10 1
When we see model 0, as compared to Somerville's result based on 1987, the variables'
statistical power is similar. Permit as demand, number of farm as indicator for need to land
assembly, percentage of farm acreage as developable land supply shows similar statistical
power. However, the sensitivity2 8 of firm size by permits' change showed one and half
times higher than 1987 dataset, as shown in table 23.
XiAY/A 1SD of X
1987 data Model 0 Model 1
ln()_Permit 46% 71%
ln()_Permit/stock 63%
ln()_Housing unit 85%
In_Farm No -21% -21% -24%
In()O/o farm(land) 13% 19% 20%
[Table 22 sensitivity test in model 0
(2005) and Somerville's 1987 data
results]
Compared to market demand, the number of farms and the area of a farm as developable
land results in similar sensitivity of firm size with 1987 data set. Land assembly showed
weaker statistical power in models 2, 3, and 4 than what model 0 shows, although
Somerville's model showed strong statistical providence between the number of farms and
firm size.
The firm size is highly sensitive to the number of permits per housing stock as a function of
market activity, as shown in Table 23. Also, housing unit as a function of market size also
28 Sensitivity of variables is % change of firm size by one standard of deviation increase of
dependant variables near mean value.
showed considerable impact to firm size, compared to other variables. Therefore, it said
that firm size is sensitively increasing along with market size and demand. Land area as a
function of whole area, rather than the sum of land and water area, showed high sensitivity
and t value, but still remains incompatible, as evidence by its 95% significance level.
I assumed that the financial cost of the housing market would be relevant. However,
mortgage costs, as well as mortgage rates, would not show statistical proof to builder size
as shown in Model 2. I cannot reject the Ho for financial accessibility relevance with
respect to firm size. Using the number of investment banking and securities establishments
does not show the financial impact on firm size. The financial accessibility's irrelevance to
firm size seems somewhat counterintuitive. The construction loan market would affect
significantly builders' operations, because the key factor for the builder is access to
financial sources with competitive market rates. The financial accessibility may not affect
to firm size directly. Rather, it can be affected by firm size as indicated in the literature.
Model 3 reports that it is hard to reject the zero coefficient hypotheses. The construction
cost is also an issue for which results are also counterintuitive. However, compared to
Somerville's previous results, which showed a very low t-value of 0.005 when using the RS
means residential square-foot cost index, the results seems more preferable with higher
adjusted r square.
In model 4, I tested the median housing value of each MSA as first indicator for price effect
on firm size. It showed a 17% increase in firm size by one standard deviation increase of
median housing value over mean value. This showed that there is enough relevance
between firm size and housing price level, which is omitted in previous models. Under the
urban spatial theory model, rather than the reduced form model of the previous model, the
price is, to be sure, the most important factor for housing supply and firm size. However, as
compared to market activity and size, the impact on firm size is not so high. And also, there
needed to be more consideration of price lag between market and homebuilder's operation
perspective. For median housing price, the correlation table is as below. There is no
significant co-linearity among variables and the residual plot showed acceptable linearity
for regression analysis.
[Table 23 Correlation test after adding median house value]
Permit / Housing No of Land median
stock unit Farms % farm area Value
permit/Stock I
Housing Unit -0.132 1
No. of Farms -0.103 0.448 1
% farm -0.107 -0.176 0.201 1
Land Area 0.131 0.422 0.455 -0.125 1
Median Value -0.168 0.265 -0.072 -0.204 0.039 1
2. Finding price lag
In model 4, one standard deviation increase of median housing price near its mean value
results in around 17% increase in firm size with reliable statistical power. However, it is
uncertain whether builders react to the market based on the current housing market price or
previous price shock with time lag.
Graph 11 showed the housing price
pattern's growth rate. As housing
price increases steadily, there is a
somewhat periodical cycle of price
growth rate. Therefore I use
housing price index to see the usual
time lag that impacts the firm size.29
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[Graph 7 Transaction housing price and yearly
growth rate over 20 years in U.S.1
I assume that the builders react to current price levels and estimates of the future price level
based on current growth level. I tested the 5-year price growth rate effect on firm size
because, as we see above, the cycle falls within a 5 year span. The below table shows
each housing price index, which indicates the relative growth rate over the previous year.
[Table 24 Regression results with 5 years housing price index of 2003, 2005, and 2007]
2007 2005 2003
Obs. 200 Obs. 140 Obs. 171
Ajd. R F Ajd. R F Ajd. R F
0.355 11.968 0.365 9.000 0.409 14.076
Coef t Coef t Coef t
Intercept -1.095 -1.895 -1.342 -1.459 -0.228 -0.281
LNPermit/stock 0.118 1.813 0.329 3.103 0.607 6.333
LN HUEST 0.347 6.880 0.613 6.663 0.570 7.094
LN_Farms (No) -0.117 -1.934 -0.306 -3.065 -0.265 -2.921
LN % Farm 0.121 1.994 0.398 3.970 0.278 3.053
HPI g(Pt -Pt-1) -2.240 -1.684 -0.974 -0.873 3.220 1.248
HPI g(Pt-1 -Pt-2) 1.382 1.125 5.408 2.921 -4.322 -1.051
HPI g(Pt-2 -Pt-3) -0.377 -0.458 -3.338 -0.893 4.863 1.397
HPI g(Pt-3 -Pt-4) 2.970 2.348 -2.930 -0.707 3.716 1.766
HPI g(Pt-4 -Pt-5) -2.493 -1.737 3.321 0.952 -3.301 -1.479
29 Median Housing value cannot reflect the difference of price level over regions. However,
housing price index is measured as relative growth rate of housing price for each MSAs.
Each MSA's housing price of the base year is set as 100. And housing price index show the
relative growth of housing price.
Data from 2007 showed relevance for the previous four years with respect to the housing
price index and had a reliable t-statistical reading. 2005 data showed two-year lag of price
to firm size with statically power. However, it is hard to generalize the time lag that
affected firm size with using all the 5 year housing price index. Therefore, I tested each
years housing price index separately and find adjustable year to whole three years data set
to further analysis shown in table 26.
[Table 25 Regression results with yearly housing price index over 5 years]
2007
Obs. 200
Coef t
LN Permit/stock 0.190 3.368
LN HUEST 0.343 6.749
LN_Farms (No) (0.138) (2.263)
LN % Farm 0.066 1.170
HPI g(Pt -Pt-.) (2.868) (4.567)
LN Permit/stock 0.162 2.444
LN HUEST 0.399 7.590
LN_Farms (No) (0.203) (3.254)
LN % Farm 0.085 1.381
HPI g(Pt-, -Pt-2) (0.386) (0.461)
LN Permit/stock 0.143 2.598
LN HUEST 0.365 7.439
LN_Farms (No) (0.139) (2.327)
LN % Farm 0.139 2.474
HPI g(Pt-3 -Pt 4 ) 2.417 5.095
LN Permit/stock 0.168 2.924
LN HUEST 0.386 7.630
LN_Farms (No) (0.181) (2.969)
LN % Farm 0.123 2.106
HPI g(Pt4 -Pt-5) 2.451 3.196
2005
Obs. 140
Coef t
0.302 2.937
0.639 6.925
(0.343) (3.415)
0.385 3.736
1.389 1.873
0.318 3.470
0.614 6.797
(0.306) (3.111)
0.392 3.899
2.373 3.207
0.392 4.289
0.650 7.053
(0.365) (3.673)
0.389 3.750
2.082 1.420
0.384 4.200
0.651 7.083
(0.365) (3.691)
3.742
1.548
0.387
3.044
2003
Obs. 171
Coef t
0.632 6.771
0.593 7.464
(0.295) (3.264)
0.300 3.321
2.953 2.578
0.652 7.017
0.590 7.361
(0.298) (3.291)
0.300 3.305
3.291 2.326
0.671 7.208
0.585 7.203
(0.300) (3.300)
0.271 2.986
2.578 2.065
0.666 7.055
0.618 7.628
(0.329) (3.606)
0.281
0.461
3.056
0.315
LN Permit/stock 0.087 1.517 0.376 4.131 0.629 6.746
LN HUEST 0.381 7.688 0.650 7.130 0.586 7.351
LN Farms (No) (0.155) (2.563) (0.356) (3.615) (0.295) (3.266)
LN % Farm 0.131 2.293 0.392 3.811 0.298 3.301
HPI g(Pt-2 P,.3) 1.794 4.330 2.372 2.004 5.063 2.660
M___ - M
I highlight the adjustable statistical value as shown in table 26 and find common years that
are adjustable over five years as certain price lags. As we see in table 29, for 2007 dataset,
years 3, 4, and 5 showed statistical relevance to firm size. For 2005 dataset, the three years
past HPI, and for 2003 datset, 3 and 4 years past HPI, showed statistical evidence of the
relevance of firm size. Therefore, three years lag of housing price index satisfy all three
dataset.
3. Regulatory impact
Overall, regulatory stringency had a very low impact on firm size as shown below based on
the 2005 dataset taken from the Wharton survey. This result seems counterintuitive,
because the regulatory environment has, to be sure, a direct or indirect cost on
homebuilders. One possible explanation is that two opposite impacts of regulatory
stringency on firm size offset the effects of each other, resulting in the statistical irrelevance
of size of firm. If regulatory stringency is considered as a cost for builders, large builders
can survive under the same regulatory environment. Alternatively, regulatory stringency
means that communities encourage small development and discourage those builders who
seek to build large projects quickly. Therefore, it is needed to dissect the regulatory
stringency with detail treatments of each item, using sub indexes. I tested eleven sub index
separately with previous models and the results show that except for the Approval Delay
index(ADI) and the Density restriction Index(DRI), most sub indexes showed low
statistical power in explaining firm size as shown in table 27.Therefore, I process the
analysis with those two variables to build model.
[Table 26 Results summary of each regulatory variables impact to model 5]
State Approval Dtrect Dect
Pubhc partciaton volvement I Strmenc Cost to builders Restriction
LPPI LAI SPII SCII LZAI LPAI OSI El ADI SRI DRI
COEF
T
0 080
1 131
-0.336
-0413
0 025
0.398
0.111
1.147
-0.076
-0 629
0.072
0777
0211
1.093
0.229 0.043
1.068 1 '56
0.059
0.633
-0.413
-1 '8'
By excluding unrelated variables such as financial variables, the available MSA records
increase to 182. Although construction costs show few t statistics, the adjusted r square in
model 3 increased greatly as compared to model 0 and model 1, which I kept including in
the analysis. The results are shown in table 28.
[Table 27 Regression Summary table with regulation data]
Variables
Intercept
In()_
Permit/Housing Unit
In()_
Housing unit
In()_
Farm(No)
In()_
Farm(% acre)
In()_
HPI g(Pt-2-pt-3)
In_
Construction cost
In_
ADI
In_
DRI
Adi. R2
Model 5 Model 10
-2.631 -2.90
(-3.092) (-2.707)
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
-2.714 -2.563 -2.021 -2.042
(-2.47) (-2.976) (-2.387) (-2.380)
0.352 0.365 0.368 0.367 0.454 0.436
(3.713) (3.726) (3.778) (3.781) (4.891) (4.630)
0.702 0.700 0.695 0.695 0.715 0.760
(7.99) (7.950) (7.763) (7.791) (7.948) (8.504)
-0.279 -0.279 -0.281 -0.281 -0.328 -0.368
(-2.696) (-2.694) (-2.684) (-2.689) (-3.167) (-3.539)
0.397 0.396 0.384 0.384 0.361 0.363
(3.906) (3.888) (3.723) (3.733) (3.497) (3.457)
2.776 2.705 2.340 2.362
(3.383) (3.221) (2.508) (2.51)
0.061 0.036
(0.417) (0.237)
0.024 0.025 0.054
(0.868) (0.928) (2.199)
-0.124 -0.128
(-0.550) (-0.572)
-0.140
(-0.621)
0.384 0.381 0.378 0.381 0.361 0.345
23.603 19,606 14.725 16.913 21.530 20.134
182 182 182 182 182 182
* All models independent variables are log form of firm size
(number of employment per number of establishments)
Obs.
As we can see as number of data increase the adjusted r square increase to around 38%
compared to 27% of model 4.
There is no significant statistical proof for regulatory impact shown in model 10, 11, and 12.
Housing price index increase adjusted r-square with significant t statistics, but it seems to
show multi-co-linearity with approval delay index when we compare model 12 and model
13. The correlation between housing price index and approval delay index is 47%, thus
supporting the co-linearity of the two variables. However, when we extract the housing
price index as shown in model 13, the approval delay index shows significant level t
statistical relevance.
4. Grouping data and sensitivity test
Below is Regional Geographical Difference of Firm Size. The 2005 and 2007 data
showed quite strong statistical evidence for regional effect on firm size. It is quite apparent
that the firms in Midwest region are smaller than ones in West region.
[Table 28 Regression results after adding regional dummies]
2002 2005 2007
Adj. R2  0.409 0.412 0.349
Obs. 172 159 269
F(MSR,MSE) 15.776 14.817 16.948
Variables COEF T COEF t COEF t
YIntercept (2.345) (2.470) (1.878) (1.911) 0.140 0.222
LN Permit/Stock 0.615 5.696 0.336 2.950 0.133 2.641
LN HUEST 0.600 7.398 0.781 8.982 0.327 7.184
LN % Farm 0.385 4.026 0.502 4.635 0.077 1.561
LN_No Farms (0.313) (3.442) (0.412) (4.059) (0.102) (1.946)
LN_HPI 0.184 2.019 0.010 0.121 (0.010) (3.814)
Northeast (0.085) (0.431) (0.465) (2.089) (0.199) (1.898)
Midwest (0.310) (1.943) (0.620) (2.935) (0.190) (2.015)
South (0.104) (0.772) (0.498) (3.210) (0.155) (2.006)
West(0,0,0)
However, among northeast, Midwest, and south regions there are no apparent pattern that
can be said to indicate geographical differences that impact firm size. One possible
explanation is that the average large MSA area in the West compared to Midwest causes
firm sizes to be bigger. So, I tested the firm size by grouping the dataset by market size and
price growth rate and comparing the sensitivity of firm size variations of each group.
Firstly, market size is grouped by Oistribution of housing unit
number of housing units. As 60 100%
80%
40 60%indicated in graph 8, the distribution 2 40%20
U-20 20%
of housing units is highly rightly 0o ........ - . - 0o%
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Qass of No. of housing unit
skewed, which can be biased by
[Graph 8 Housing unit distribution and accumulated
outliers in the form of large MSAs. percentage of stock based on 2005 data]
So, I grouped the datasets based on
mean value of housing unit and number of MSAs and tested the difference between the two
groups. Most MSAs, almost 69% of them, show their number of housing units as not more
than the mean value of 362,342 single family unit in MSAs. And as indicated in graph 8's
accumulated percentage of stock, the larger MSAs showed very even distribution in
housing stock.
Compared to housing units, the land area is a more fundamental geographic aspect when
compared to firm size, as related to land supply and land assembly issues. Also, market size
is, to be sure, constrained by the land area. The distribution of land area shows a similar
pattern to 'housing unit.' Around 50% of MSAs' land area is not less than the mean value
and they are distributed quite evenly.
As same with above method, I grouped the dataset by HPI to see how the growth rate of
housing prices affects firm size. Sixty-four percent of MSAs are showing below the mean
value of housing price index, and also show a rightly skewed distribution pattern. Based on
2005 and 2004, the average housing price growth rate is around 7%.
Table 29 showed the result of different sensitivity by grouping.
Grouled by
Model 5
LNPermit/Stock
LNHUEST
LN_% Farm
LNFarms No.
HPI g(03)
* Each number
variable.
[Table 29 Sensitivity test by grouping the MSA's size and price]
Mnarket Size Geoaphic area Housing Price
Model Model Model Model Model Model
15a 15b 16a 16b 17a 17b
Whole < Mean > Mean < mean > mean < mean > mean
23.5% 20.4% 27.5% 19.1% 24.6% 17.0% 30.6%
65.1% 24.0% 35.9% 42.4% 59.3% 83.0% 46.0%
36.9% 26.9% 27.4% 27.3% 30.3% 41.4% 25.2%
-21.1% -20.6% -22.8% -25.1% -20.0% -28.4%
112.5% 115.7% 138.5%
shows % change of firm size by one standard deviation increase of each
First of all, grouping lowers the percent changes of firm size by one standard deviation
increase of housing units, particularly as compared to whole aggregated results. Small
MSAs and Large MSAs show a rate of 24% and 36% each, as compared to a 65% rate
overall. Meaningful results seem to indicate that the lower MSA's showed less sensitivity
than small MSAs, thus showing that there is much more growth opportunity in small MSAs
as a result of expected increases of the population's housing demand. This result is
consistent with the permit per stock results. Large MSAs showed more sensitivty than
small MSAs, at 28%, meaning that one standard deviation increase of newly added stock as
market activity in large markets enlarges firm size 7% more than in small market.
However, land supply and land assembly data showed similar level between large and small
MSAs which seems affected little by MSA market size as determinants for firm size
variation.
Overall results showed that geographically large areas showed more sensitivity than small
size MSAs, along with all the variables, meaning that a large geographical area is more
sensitive to structural elements in variation of firm size. In comparing results based on
housing unit, large land areas show more growth opportunity in terms of firm size as well
as more developable land and a decreased possibility of fragmentation as indicated in
Table 29. In large MSAs, firm size can be more elastic by 3% and 5%, respectively, with
respect to land supply and fragmentation issues.
It is unsure that how much land area affects market size and permit per stocks. However,
Table 29 shows that geographically large MSAs showed a larger increase in firm size'
sensitivity by increase of housing unit than large MSAs classified by housing unit do. And
in terms of market activity, they show the opposite. It is hard to say that geographical
impact on firm size is greater than that of market size when we compare grouped data with
model 5. However, overall, MSAs size in terms of market and geographical definition
showed consistent results that the larger area can lead to more opportunities for firm growth.
In terms of housing price index, the large area shows more sensitivity of firm size by 26%
than model 5 shows. The small area showed little statistical strength. However,
although housing unit classification results showed little difference based on market size
grouping, geographical difference shows that a geographically large MSA is more sensitive
to price growth than a small one or a whole MSA. This result can be inferred that large
MSAs with a large developer and fewer assembly needs should be grounds for price
sensitivity. When we recall the urban spatial theory model, the large spatial area of markets
leads to more diverse price levels for housing depending on commuting distance. The
more detailed dynamics can be inferred from more in depth research about a geographical
area's variation and price level.
Table 29 also reports that MSAs with low inflation in housing price showed sensitivity by
market activity and a market size of 83% and 17% each. I assumed that the firm size
would be more sensitive to variables increase where the housing price is high. However, the
results doesn't show consistent pattern among variables sensitivity to firm size.
5. Grouping by regulatory variables
The previous results show that regulatory stringency does not show statistical relevance
because the overall impact of firm size might be offset by simultaneity among dependant
variables. Only approval delay index showed significant statistical power among eleven
sub-indexes. However, because the density restriction index shows the possibility to show
relevant impact to firm size, I grouped MSAs which have density restriction regulation and
compared it with others without that regulation.
As table 30 show, the restriction overall increase the sensitivity of firm size by variables
changes. Considering the assumed model that the larger builders are more durable with
respect to regulatory environment than those of small size can be, the results show that the
regulations impose a scale of economy in builder industries with a more dynamic situation
with respect to firm size variations.
[Table 30 Comparison of regression Results by existence of density restriction]
With Density Restriction Index Without Density Restriction Index
F 12.56 4.413
Adj. R2  0.442 0.207
Obs. 74 66
% change of % change of
Coef. S.E t Firm size30  Coef. S.E t Firm size
Intercept -2.20 1.19 -1.84 0.76 1.66 0.46
In Permit/Stock 0.47 0.13 3.67 24% 0.21 0.14 1.49 15%
In HUEST 2005 0.75 0.13 5.88 67% 0.45 0.17 2.70 39%
In No. of Farm -0.34 0.14 -2.38 -30% -0.39 0.14 -2.78 -33%
In % Farm 0.41 0.15 2.76 24% 0.26 0.16 1.59
HPI g(03) 2.47 1.72 1.44 3.18 1.81 1.76
To measure the impact of the approval delay index as it pertains to the cost of development
process, I grouped the data set by the approval delay index. I use first quartile as highly
delayed MSAs and forth quartile of index value as lightly delayed MSAs in processing the
approval.
Table 31 reports the results, although some variables don't show statistical power,
supposedly due to lack of observation for each group. The short approval delays increase
the sensitivity by the market activity variable to firm size at a rate of 26%, which is greater
than the 22% of long delayed MSAs. This makes sense in that less delay in the process
30 Measured by % change of firm size by one standard deviation increase of independent
variable.
term of approval, makes a firm more active in their reaction to demand shock. Market size
that shows a long approval index group shows more sensitivity of firm size by market size.
It can be also referred that the highly regulated place with a long delay process induces
costs that large firms can endure and the firm size's variation becomes wider based on
some other factors, including market size.
[Table 31 Comparison of regression Results by intensity of Approval process]
I s quartile of Approval 4th quartile of Approval
delay index: longer delay delay index: shorter delay
F 2.75 3.56
Adj. R2  0.17 0.23
Obs. 35 35
% change % change
Coef. t of Firm size Coef. t of Firm size
Intercept -0.35 -0.16 0.37 0.21
In Permit/Stock 0.50 2.12 22% 0.41 2.23 26%
In HUEST 2005 0.70 2.64 55% 0.37 2.13 38%
In No. of Farm -0.46 -1.73 -36% -0.04 -0.23
In % Farm 0.42 1.49 0.31 1.60
Chapter VII: Conclusion and policy implication
1. Conclusion
The firm size as measured by employment per establishment shows wide spatial variation
over regions. The variation is systematic rather than random and helps to understand
homebuilders' behavior. Based on an urban spatial theory approach which assumes supply
of housing is constrained to population growth in the long run, this research reports that the
limited number of establishments of homebuilders in each region adjusts their size to
accommodate variations in housing demand in the market. The analysis shows that the firm
size at given time is affected by various factors with statistical proof from the market, land
supply, and regulatory perspective.
[Table 32 Results summary based on Model 5]
One standard deviation % increase Assuming new permit as equilibrium amount to
increase of of firm size
Demand 24%. demand for housing, market demand increases
Market size 65%.
Housing price index 112%31 firm size by 24% from mean value. Market size of
Land supply 37%
fragmentation 21% region shows most significant impact on firm size.
One standard deviation of total housing unit from mean value leads to an increase in firm
size of 65%. In the same way, the amount of existing developable land affects firm size by
around 37% and necessity of land assembly for project shows a negative impact on firm
size of 21%. Increase of housing value results in increasing firm by 20%, and the average
price lag over 10 years shows 3 years is the norm.
31 based on stylized price lag of three years.
Aggregated regulatory stringency's impact on firm size shows little statistical power. This
result cannot be seen as sufficient evidence for lack of relationship between regulatory
stringency and firm size. However, one possible explanation is that the impact of
regulatory stringency is diluted by simultaneities among the regulatory sub index.
Density restriction and approval delay showed meaningful results. The effect of density
restriction regulation is shown by comparison of groups. The duration of the approval
process show strong statistical proof. One standard deviation increase of delay, measured
by month, resulted in an average 110% larger firm in the market, which means that large
firms are associated with higher costs of delays on a project. The existence of density
restrictions in markets induces firm size to be more sensitive to other structural variables'
impact than in MSAs without density restriction articles. When we assume that large
builders can have economies of scale in terms of costs accrued by restrictions, or have more
effective bargain power in the approval process than small builders do, the firm size
increases as regulations become stricter. The results support this explanation by showing
firm size association with costs accrued by density restriction and approval delay.
Market size in terms of number of existing stock and geographical area affect firm size in
that the sensitivity of firm size to structural elements are higher in larger MSA area. This
means that there is more growth opportunity in larger market. Small MSA with less
competition or weak market entry barriers can be seen as advantageous for firms to grow
faster. However, results support the urban spatial model which assumes that supply is
limited to given market conditions such as market size. With the optimal number of
establishments in the region, size varies more passively, depending on structural elements.
2. Policy implication of distribution of firm size
Assumptions for regulatory impact to firm size or development size for policy were as
below.
Firstly, when large builders can have economies of scale in terms of costs accrued by
restrictions, or have more effective bargain power in the approval process than small
builders do, the firm size increases as regulations become stricter.
Secondly, if large builders can influence related regulation more easily when there are
upper jurisdictions or when Dillon's rule32 allows them to press their case with the state,
then larger developers can survive under that jurisdiction's structure.
The last assumption is that residents see their interests served by controlling development,
restricting development to preserve the value of the public goods. If this model prevails, the
regulatory stringency will affect firm size negatively.
The results of approval delay index and density restriction index support the first
assumptions. However, involvement of the upper jurisdiction and court does not show a
reliable statistical relationship vis-ai-vis the power to support second assumption. The local
assembly index, which captures community meetings or assembly reviews of a project also
32 Dillon's Rule: The theory of state preeminence over local governments was expressed as Dillon's Rule in a
1868 case: "Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so may it
destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
does not show statistical proof enough to test last assumption.
One possible explanation is based on implicit findings about regulations index. Aggregated
regulatory stringency shows a high correlation with market and demographic perspective
dataset. In particular, rent and income levels of MSAs, measured by fair market rent and
per capita income, respectively, show correlation with regulatory stringency at a rate of
47% and 60%. In addition, Table 33 reports more interesting results in terms of regulation.
Local political pressure, as measured by the degree of democratic involvement and
participation in the development process, as well as other approval indexes show a high
sensitivity to rent level with statistical proof. And also, the state political involvement index
with strong statistical proof shows that upper jurisdiction's involvement in localities also
increases the market rent level.
[Table 33 Rent level and regulatory sub index relevance, based on 2005 county level]
Summary Variables
F 51.713 Coef
Adj. R2  0.411 Intercept 622.824
Obs. 800 LPPI 49.061
SPII 33.467
SCII 2.067
LZAI -34.752
LPAI 6.292
LAI 57.301
DRI 23.401
OSI 11.723
El -45.721
SRI 9.881
ADI 26.506
* Independent variables are log form of rent level of MSAs
SE
30.741
7.974
6.065
8.921
8.918
7.107
37.197
18.557
14.435
16.256
8.841
2.024
t
20.260
6.152
5.518
0.232
-3.897
0.885
1.540
1.261
0.812
-2.813
1.118
13.098
When we adapt the assumption that large builders can have more effective bargaining
power with upper jurisdiction entities, the more local level restrictions on large builders
leads to more motivation for large builders to negotiate with upper jurisdiction, resulting in
escalating the market price of housing.
Although the impact of regulatory stringency to prevent large development is uncertain,
regulations seem associated with housing price escalation.
3. Further Research
First of all, compared to MSA level analysis, county level data gathering and analysis
seems more accurate and can reveal more facts about industrial structure. For example,
comparative studies between counties in MSA regions and others may reveal more
fundamental findings about systematic variations in firm size. Secondly, construction cost
and income level's impact on firm size shows no relevance to organization structure, which
is very counterintuitive. Obviously, updating regulatory surveys with sophisticated
definition of municipal boundaries based on county level will help to corporate land use
regulatory variables to other ones.
Secondly, a direct survey of builders may find more information about non systematic
elements which affect firm size and can be another research topic under frame of systematic
variation. The systematic variation of firm size is explained by structural variables at the
level of around 30% of adjustable R square. There are, to be sure, many idiosyncratic
factors to firm size interrelating to structural factor.
Thirdly, the Gibrat's rule that explains independency between firm size and its growth
needs more careful attention and research in the homebuilders industry. Based on 20 years
of records, the county level growth rate of firm size shows a high correlation between the
current level of firm size. It seems to depend on the fact that local housing builders
generally take the role of housing supply in their region over long period.
Lastly, more qualitative models for explaining the impact of firm size on social value, with
broader view than just a regulatory perspective seems needed in order to explain and
support the industrial structure's implication on policy makers.
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[Attachment 1 Source of Somerville's research and summary of results]
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[Attachment 2 number of distribution of establishment with employment range]
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[Attachment 3 Source of Somerville's research and summary of results]
Regression 1 regression 2 regression 3
County Business Census of National Association of
Data Source Pattern Construction Homebuilders Survey
Year Data source 1987 1987 1992
In In In
Dependent Variable (employ. Per estb.) (employ. Per estb.) (employ. Per estb.)
In(single family permits) 0.276 0.298 0.342
T 9.86 8.28 4.89
In(no. of farms) -0.221 -0.226 -0.296
T -4.80 -4.91 -3.02
In(farm acreage as % of MSA) 0.232 0.229 0.274
T 5.66 5.73 3.86
No. of observations 302 302 80
Adj. R2 0.297 0.299 0.295
ln(No. of Jurisdiction) -0.129 -0.185
T -0.606 -1.603
No. of observations 60 57 33
Adj. R2 0.299 0.309 0.357
[Attachment 4 Data source, year, geography land of aggregation summary]
Data Source Data Geography land Year Use
of aggregation
County Operative builder's MSA 2003, 05, 07 Size
Business -Number of Employment and Establishment County
Pattern Number of Establishment of
-Investment banking and securities Capital Access
-Financial Institute
Manufacturing, Single family MSA 2003, 05, 07
Mining and -Yearly Number of permits Demand
Construction statistics -Value of construction (dollar) Cost
Housing and Housing stock estimates County 2003, 05, 07 Market Size
Urban DeveloPment
American Housing Fair Market Rent estimates County 2003, 05, 07 Rent
Survey
Federal housing Housing Price Index MSA 2003, 05, 07 Housing value increase
financial Agency
Census of Number of Farm County 2003, 05, 07 Land Assembly
Agriculture data Land of Farm (acreage) Land SupplY
Wharton Urban Regulatory index Place 2005 Regulatory variables
Decentralization
Project data set
Census 2000 Land area County 2000 Geographical Area
Housing Value
Office of Management RlPS code County, MSA 2003 Indexing
and Budget State
American National FIPS code Place, County 2005 Indexing
Standards Institute
[Attachment 5 CBP data record layout]
Data
Name DescriptionType
FIPSTATE TXT FIPS State Code
FIPSCTY TXT FIPS County Code
NAICS TXT Industry Code - 6-digit NAICS code.
Data Suppression Flag3
K 25,000-
H 2,500-4,999 49,999A 0-19 E 250-499
EMPFLAG TXT F 500-999 I 5,000-9,999 L 50,000-
J 10,000- 99,999C 100-249 G 1,000-2,499
24,999 M 100,000 or
More
EMP NUM Total Mid-March Employees
QP1 NUM First Quarter Payroll ($1,000)
AP NUM Total Annual Payroll ($1,000)
EST NUM\ Total Number of Establishments
N1 4 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:1-4 Employees
N5 9 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:5-9 Employees
N10 19 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:10-19 Employees
N20 49 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:20-49 Employees
N50 99 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:50-99 Employees
N100 249 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:100-249
Employees
N250 499 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:250-499
Employees
N500 999 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:500-999
Employees
N1000 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class: 1,000 Or More
Employees
N1000_1 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class: 1,000-1,499
Employees
N1000_2 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:1,500-2,499
Employees
N1000_3 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:2,500-4,999
Employees
N1000_4 NUM Number of Establishments: Employment Size Class:5,000 or More
Employees
CENSTATE TXT Census State Code
CENCTY TXT Census County Code
33 This denotes employment size class for data withheld to avoid disclosure. Employment and payroll data
are replaced by zeroes.
[Attachment 6 WRLURI data record layout]
variable name Value label variable label
state State
statename 2-letter state abbreviation
id Identification Code
ufips FIPS code
name jurisdiction name
type jurisdiction type
msaname99 MSA/PMSA Name 1999 Definitions
msa99 MSA/PMSA Code
stateld stateid 2-letter state abbreviation
msastate MSA or State Code
stacode stacode State Code
namene nameNE
local local council involvement in regulation (1-not at all, 5-very)
pressure community pressure involvement m regulation (1-not at all, 5-very)
countyleg county legislature involvement in regulation (1-not at all, 5-very)
stateleg state legislature involvement in regulation (1-not at all, 5-very)
localcourts local courts involvement in regulation (1-not at all, 5-very)
statecourts state courts involvement in regulation (1-not at all, 5-very)
commission questions2 3 planning commission approval required for rezoning, O=no, 1=yes, 2=yes by superm
loczonmg questions2 3 local zoning board approval required for rezoning, O=no, 1 =yes, 2=yes by superma
council questions2 3 local council approval required for rezoning, O=no, 1 =yes, 2=yes by supermajority
cntyboard questions2 3 county board approval required for rezoning, 0-no, 1 =yes, 2=yes by supermajority
cntyzonmg questions2 3 county zoning board approval required for rezoning, O=no, 1 =yes, 2=yes by superm
envboard questions2 3 environmental review board approval required for rezoning, 0-=no, 1yes, 2=yes by
commission no-z questions2 3 planning commission approval required (norezonmg), O=no, 1yes, 2yes by superm
council norez questions2 3 local council approval required (norezonmg), 0-no, 1=yes, 2=yes by supermajonty
cntyboard norez questions2 3 county board approval required (norezonmg), O=no, 1=yes, 2=yes by supermajority
envboard norez questions2 3 environ review board approval required (norezoning), O=no, 1 yes, 2=yes by super
publhlth norez questions2 3 public health off approval required (norezoning), O=no, 1=yes, 2=yes by supermaj
dsgnrev norez questions2 3 design review board approval required (norezoning), 0-no, 1 yes, 2=yes by superm
sfulandsupply question4 supply of land importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfulandsupply question4 supply of land importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfuinfracost question4 cost of mfracture importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfuinfracost question4 cost of infracture importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfudensrestr question4 density restrictions importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfudensrestr question4 density restrictions importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfuimpact question4 impact fees/exactions importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfuimpact question4 impact fees/exactions importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfubudget question4 city budget constraints importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfubudget question4 city budget constraints importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfucouncil question4 council opposition importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfucouncil question4 council opposition importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfucitizen question4 citizen opposition importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfucitizen question4 citizen opposition importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfuschool question4 school crowding importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfuschool question4 school crowding importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfulengthzoning question4 length zoning process importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfulengthzoning question4 length zoning process importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfulengthpermit question4 length permit process importance (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfulengthpermit question4 length permit process importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfulengthdvlp question4 length development process (single family) 1-not at all, 5-very
mfulengthdvlp question4 length development process importance (multi family) 1-not at all, 5-very
sfupermitlimit question5 sf annual permit limit, O=no, 1=yes
mfupermitlimit questionS mf annual permit limit, O=no, 1 =yes
sfuconstrlimit questionS sf annual construction units limit, O=no, 1 yes
mfuconstrllmit questionS mf annual construction units limit, 0-no, 1 =yes
mfudwelllimit questionS mf dwelling hmit, O=no, 1=yes
mfudwellunitl-t questionS num. of units m mfdwelling limit, O=no, 1=yes
minlotsize question6 min lot size requirement, 0=no, 1=yes
minlotsize lh-e question6 <=0 5 acre minlotsize requirement, 0=no, 1 =yes
minlotsize mh-e question6 >0 5 acre minlotsize requirement, 0=no, 1 =yes
minlotsize on--e question6 >1 acre minlotsize requirement, 0=no, 1=yes
minlotsize tw-s question6 >2 acres mmlotsize requirement, 0=no, 1 =yes
affordable question6 affordable housing requirement, O=no, 1=yes
sfusupply question7 sf zoned land supply compared to demand, 1-far more, 5-far less
mfusupply question7 mf zoned land supply compared to demand, 1-far more, 5-far less
commsupply question7 commercially zoned land supply compared to demand, 1-far more, 5-far less
idsupply question7 industrially zoned land supply compared to demand, 1--far more, 5-far less
lotdevcostinc-e questions8 9 lot development cost increase (last 10 years)
sflotdevcosti-e questions8 9 single family lot development cost increase (last 10 years)
time sfu review tune for single family units (months)
time mfu review time for multi family units (months)
timechg sfu question 11 change in review/appr time for sf projects over decade, O--none, 1=longer, 2=much
timechg_ mfu question 11 change in review/appr time for mf projects over decade, O=none, 1=longer, 2=much
timel lO50sfu questionsl2 13 permit lag for rezoning, <50 sf unts, mths-midpomt
timel m50sfu questionsl2 13 permit lag for rezoning, >50 sf units, mths-midpoint
timel mfu questions12 13 permit lag for rezoning, mf project, mths-midpoint
time2 150sfu questions 12 13 permit lag for subdivision appr (norezoning), <50 sf units, mths-midpoint
time2 m50sfu questions12 13 permit lag for subdivision appr (norezoning), >50 sf units, mths-midpoint
time2 mfu questions12 13 permit lag for subdivision appr (norezonmg), mf project, mths-midpomt
submitted # applications for zoning changes submitted (last 12 months)
alloc local Allocation Flag for Variable local
allocpressure Allocation Flag for Variable pressure
alloc countyleg Allocation Flag for Variable countyleg
alloc sfubudget Allocation Flag for Variable sfubudget
alloc mfubudget Allocation Flag for Variable mfubudget
alloc sfucoun~l Allocation Flag for Variable sfucouncil
alloc mfucoun-l Allocation Flag for Variable mfucouncil
alloc sfuciti-n Allocation Flag for Variable sfucitizen
alloc mfuciti-n Allocation Flag for Variable mfucitizen
alloc sfuschool Allocation Flag for Variable sfuschool
alloc mfuschool Allocation Flag for Variable mfuschool
alloc LPPI Allocation Flag for Variable LPPI
alloc time sfu Allocation Flag for Variable time sfu
alloc time mfu Allocation Flag for Variable time mfu
alloc timel l-u Allocation Flag for Variable timel 150sfu
alloc '1 m50sfu Allocation Flag for Variable timel m50sfu
alloc timel mfu Allocation Flag for Variable timel mfu
alloc time2 l-u Allocation Flag for Variable time2 150sfu
alloc -2 m50sfu Allocation Flag for Variable time2 m50sfu
alloc time2 mfu Allocation Flag for Variable time2 mfu
alloc ADI Allocation Flag for Variable ADI
approved # applications for zoning changes approved (last 12 months)
officialname name of official filling the survery
execrating State Legislative Profile (Foster and Summers)
judicialrating State Judicial Profile (Foster and Summers)
town meet Town Meeting for of Government
zonvote Town Meeting Aproves Zoning Changes
zonvote super Town Meeting Aproves Zoning Changes by a Super-Majority
totinitiatives Total number of initiatives from 1996-2005
[Attachment 7 Descriptive summary of individual data of WRLURI]
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
local 2729 4.37 0.96 1 5
pressure 2729 3.18 1.06 1 5
countyleg 2729 1.85 1.05 1 5
stateleg 2659 2.19 1 11 1 5
localcourts 2658 1.65 0 87 1 5
statecourts 2660 1.76 0 95 1 5
commission 2728 0.75 0 50 0 2
loczoning 2728 0.32 0.52 0 2
council 2728 0.94 0 45 0 2
cntyboard 2728 0.06 0 26 0 2
cntyzonmng 2728 005 0.23 0 2
envboard 2728 0.03 0.18 0 2
commission-z 2718 0.72 0.49 0 2
council no-z 2718 046 0.53 0 2
cntyboard -z 2718 006 0.24 0 2
envboard n-z 2718 0.07 0.27 0 2
publhlth n-z 2718 0.11 0.31 0 2
dsgnrev_no-z 2718 019 0.41 0 2
sfulandsup-y 2651 3 94 1.35 1 5
mfulandsup-y 2558 3 89 1.38 1 5
sfuminfracost 2638 3 39 1.31 1 5
mfumfracost 2541 3 34 1.32 1 5
sfudensrestr 2638 301 1.39 1 5
mfudensrestr 2541 3 26 1.41 1 5
sfulmpact 2620 2 10 1.23 1 5
mfulmpact 2523 2 13 1.24 1 5
sfubudget 2729 232 1.39 1 5
mfubudget 2729 2.31 1.40 1 5
sfucouncil 2729 208 1.28 1 5
mfucouncil 2729 2 38 1.42 1 5
sfucitizen 2729 247 1.24 1 5
mfucitizen 2729 2 83 1.36 1 5
sfuschool 2729 223 1 28 1 5
mfuschool 2729 231 1.33 1 5
sfulengthz-g 2643 199 1 11 1 5
mfulengthz-g 2547 2 08 1 18 1 5
sfulengthp-t 2641 1 84 1 08 1 5
mfulengthp-t 2545 188 1 11 1 5
sfulengthd-p 2642 2.08 1.18 1 5
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
mfulengthd-p 2546 2.13 1.21 1 5
sfupermitl-t 2723 0.02 0.15 0 1
mfupermitl-t 2717 0.03 0.18 0 1
sfuconstrl-t 2722 0.02 0.14 0 1
mfuconstrl-t 2717 0.04 0.18 0 1
mfudwellli-t 2718 0.04 0 19 0 1
mfudwellun-t 2716 0.05 0.22 0 1
minlotsize 2648 0.84 0.36 0 1
mi-lhalfacre 1812 0.66 0.47 0 1
mi-mhalfacre 1923 0.39 0.49 0 1
minlot-eacre 1836 029 0.45 0 1
minlotsize-s 1813 024 0.43 0 1
affordable 2651 0 19 0.39 0 1
sfusupply 2585 3 16 1.13 1 5
mfusupply 2554 3 40 1.05 1 5
commsupply 2584 3.08 0.96 1 5
indsupply 2530 2 97 1.04 1 5
lotdevcost-e 2323 44.15 2880 10 120
sflotdevco-e 2421 53.09 31.85 10 120
time sfu 2678 349 329 -2.58 42
time mfu 2678 4 19 3 77 -6.96 42
timechg_sfu 2655 038 0.57 0 2
timechg_mfu 2616 0.44 0 62 0 2
timel 150sfu 2678 624 527 -8.32 27.28
timel m50sfu 2678 753 5.90 -527 2998
timel mfu 2678 7.12 574 -436 2619
time2 150sfu 2678 543 471 -748 24
time2 m50sfu 2678 6.52 544 1 5 24
time2 mfu 2678 6.13 528 15 24
submitted 2657 10.32 3222 0 1000
approved 2651 8.51 27 33 0 850
execrating 2728 2.27 0 73 1 3
judicialra-g 2728 2.13 0.67 1 3
town meet 2674 0.05 0.23 0 1
zonvote 2674 0.04 0.18 0 1
zonvote su-r 2674 0.02 0.13 0 1
totinitiat-s 2729 0.15 0.50 0 5
weight 2721 15 18 959 1 614
weight_metro 1993 9.42 4.71 1.00 33 48
[Attachment 8 Sub index components]
The Local Political LPPI=STD{STD[localcouncil + pressuregroup + countyleg + (sfubudget+mfubudget)/2
Pressure Index (LPPI) + (sfucouncil+mfucouncil)/2 + (sfucitizen+mfucitizen)/2 + (sfuschool+mfuschool)/2]
+ STD[totinitiatives]}
The State Political SPII=STD{STD[execrating] + STD[STATEMEAN{stateleg}] }
Involvement Index (SPII)
The State Court SCII=judicialrating
Involvement Index
(SCII)
Local Zoning Approval LZAI=commissionD + loczoningD + councilD + cntyboardD + cntyzoningD +
Index (LZAI) envboardD + zonvote.
Local Project Approval LPAI=commission_norezD + council_norezD + cntyboard_norezD + envboard_norezD
Index (LPAI) + publhlth norezD + dsgnrev_norezD
Local Assembly Index This subindex takes on a value of one if the community both has a regular town meeting
(LAI) and a requirement for a popular vote in order to approve changes to zoning regulations,
and is zero otherwise.
Supply Restrictions SRI=sfupermitlimit + mfupermitlimit + sfuconstrlimit + mfuconstrlimit +
Index (SRI) mfudwelllimit + mfuunitlimit,
Density Restrictions DRI= 1 if minlotsize_oneacre=l or minlotsizetwoacres=l; and DRI=O otherwise.
Index (DRI)
Open Space Index (OSI) OSI=1 if the community imposes such regulation and equals zero otherwise.
Exactions Index (EI) EI= 1 if developers must pay allocable shares of infrastructure improvement costs and is
zero otherwise.
Approval Delay Index ADI=[(time_sfu+time_mfu)/2 +(timel_15Osfu+timel_m5Osfu+timel mfu)/3 +
(ADI) (time2_150sfu+ time2_m50sfu+time2_mfu)/3]/3
[Attachment 9 Example of Geographical code matching process]
1.Firnn size 2. MSA level data 3. County level data 4. Place level data
(example of county level data) (example of permit) (example of Housing unit) (Regulation Data)
0 Number of counties for -- Number of MSA for single - 0 Number of Counties for total 0 Number of place in Wharton
employment and establishment: family permits : 361 housing unit: 3142 data set: 2729
1696 () Calculate aggregate sum of C Converted places to County
0 Number of counties after housing unit of counties within level by averaging index
excluding records including MSA 0 Number of counties: 1237
zero value of either 0 Check MSA level data with -Average number of places
employment or establishment: aggregated sum (Example: within counties :4.46
559 Abberville, LA MSA 20445, -Max number of place within
() Calculate employment per 2005 estimates by AHS, 23562, counties:68(Los Angeles
establishment as average county level sum, # of counties: county, CA)
number of employment per 1) -Min number of place within
establishment at counties level - Number of MSA: 922 c ounties: (Dukes county, MA
0 Calculate average of firm size -Average number of counties et al)
of counties within each MSA within MSA:1.91 0 Converted counties to MSA
C Number of MSA: 309 -Max number of counties within level by averaging index
-Average number of counties MSA: 2 8(Atlanta-Sandy © Number of MSA: 605
within MSA:1.67 Springs-Marietta, GA MSA) -Average number of Counties
-Max number of counties within -Min number of counties within within MSA :1.6
MSA:20 (New York-Newark- MSA:l(Bamstable Town, MA -Max number of Counties
Edison, NY-NJ-PA MSA) MSA et al) within MSA:21(New York-
- Min number of counties within Newark-Edison, NY-NJ-PA
MSA:l (Dublin, GA MSA et MSA)
al) -Min number of Counties
within MSA:l(Fergus Falls,
MN MSA et al)
* averaging to MSA
* Using MSA data
* Using MSA level * aggregating to MSA * averaging to MSA
[Attachment 10 2005 data set, 140 MSA records with variables name]
PennI and Finns andi Reional
Siet s1wy ConstOmcon coga Demogaphics HPI Finance Dwumnles Regvaeon(309) (309) (361) (922) (314) (414) (51) (60 5)
msa amsa £ "
name-msa name.msa msa msa MSA ID msa ID
emp2I 1  emp name-msa name-msa MSA code msa fipstateoJA t msa
est!-lti est Nolunit No of Farms 0709t1 HPI 9(07) naics NortheastM 13 name.msa
size Size Val.lunit Land in farms (acres) 07i#tI HPI g(06) emp2--IA Midwest2lg 9I,
Average size of farm (acres) 070o12 HPI 9(05) est2o~e South J J SPl l 9,o 2
Land in farms (acres) 02~J1W1 HPI 9(04) Westo-JM A SCIi qd 1 2
Farms (number) 02JVIII HPI g(03) LZAls°o-2IW2
Average size of farm (acres) 02~IW2 HPI g(02) LPAI2J1 221-
Population2Jitl HPI g(01) LAI W R 2
Housing unitole)I HPI g(00) ORi. W 1oJ _2
Total area2u.l 1 IHPI g(99) OS 2-2 21-
Land areat~)I IHPI g(98) EIo 2 W W22
Median income2192 HPI 9(97) SRI. 221J9-
per capita income~J W HPI 9(96) ADI-2JWg g2J
median Value!o?- IHPI g(95) WRLURI2OW2O-I!-
Mortgage cost-.l IHPI g(94) fipscty °- l 7I
contract rent21-2 HPI 9(93)
HUEST20020-I4t
HUEST_2003-ILPI
HUEST_2005-WI
HUEST.2007-1WI
[Attachment 11 Descriptive statistics of counties and MSAs while data processing]
Total counties Number of counties
number in 2005 whose employment
CBP data number is not zero
1696 559
Number of MSAs
from aggregated
Counties data
309
Number of MSAs
(matching with
other variables)
140
* Comparison between counties
whose employment is captured
and the other counties
Average of countys
Density
Count Housing Unit Land Area (housing unit
per land area)
Median
Housing
Value
Counties whose not zero 559 135.91% 1,068 371 129,962
employment is zero 1137 25,563 1,034 76 90,656
1696
* Comparison between counties within MSA
and the others, among 1696 counties
Average of county's
Density
Count Housing Unit Land Area (housing unit
per land area)
Median
Housing
Value
In MSA 1,315 76,882 960 218 108,536
Not in MSA 381 10,678 1,339 19 86,694
1696
Total counties Number of counties
number in 2005 whose employment
CBP data number is not zero
1696 559
Number of MSAs
from aggregated
Counties data
309
Number of MSAs
(matching with
other variables)
140
* Among counties whose employments not zero,
Comparison between counties within MSA and the other counties
Average of county's
Count Employ Establish
-ees -ment
Land Area Density
Size Housing Unit (mile 2) (housing unit
per land area)
in MSA 518 281 19 14.8 145,371 1,026 398 131,017
not in MSA 41 21 5 4.6 17.011 1,596 21 116,498
559
Median
Housing
Value($)
[Attachment 12 Index for census data used in correlation test]
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
30
31
32
33
34
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Variables
GCTPH1 US25CO
GCTPHI US25C1
GCTPH1 US25C2
GCTPH1 US25C3
GCTPH1 US25C4
GCTPH1 US25C5
GCTPH1 US25C6
GCTH5 US25C1
GCTH5 US25C2
GCTH5 US25C3
GCTH5 US25C4
GCTH5 US25C5
GCTH5 US25C6
GCTH5 US25C7
GCTH6 US25C2
GCTH6 US25C3
GCTH6 US25C4
GCTH6 US25C5
GCTH6 US25C6
GCTH6 US25C7
GCTP6 US25C1
GCTP14 US25CO
GCTP14 US25C1
GCTP14 US25C2
GCTP14 US25C3
GCTP14 US25C4
GCTP14 US25C8
GCTH9 US25Cl
GCTH9 US25C2
GCTH9 US25C3
GCTH9 US25C4
GCTH9 US25C5
GCTH9 US25C6
Explanation
Population
Housing units
Area in square miles; Total area
Area in square miles; Water area
Area in square miles; Land area
Density per square mile of land area; Population
Density per square mile of land area; Housing units
Occupied housing units
Vacant housing units; Total
Vacant housing units; Percent; For sale only
Vacant housing units; Percent; For rent
Vacant housing units; Percent; Seas., rec., or occ. use
Vacancy rate; Homeowner
Vacancy rate; Rental
Occupied housing units; Owner
Occupied housing units; Renter
Occupied housing units; Average household size
Occupied housing units; Percent; Owner
Occupied housing units; Percent; 1-person households
Occupied housing units; Percent; With householder 65 years and over
Percent of total population; Race; One race; White
Median income in 1999 (dollars); Households
Median income in 1999 (dollars); Families
Per capita income in 1999 (dollars)
Median earnings in 1999 of full-time, year-round workers (dollars); Male
Median earnings in 1999 of full-time, year-round workers (dollars); Female
Income in 1999 below poverty level; Percent of families
Specified owners; Median value (dollars)
Specified owners; Median selected monthly owner costs (dollars); With a mortgage
Specified owners; Median selected monthly owner costs (dollars); Not mortgaged
Specified renters; Median contract rent (dollars)
Specified renters; Median gross rent (dollars)
Specified renters; Percent with meals included in rent
[Attachment 13 Correlation test with size of firm]
-Black cell : positive correlation
-White cell : negative correlation
-Grey cell : irregular relation with data level
Size 6 7 8 9 10 11
>=10 7% 2% -3% 7% 1% 7% -2% -1% -7% -11% -10%
>=5 15% 10% 2% 4% -1% -3% 9% -8% -1% -8% -3%
>0 7% 2% 13% -6% 1% -8% -5% 0% -6% -6% -5%
>=0 18% 10% 11% -6% 7% 2% 3% 2% -4% -5% -4%
12 13 14 45 16 17 18 1 20 21 :22
-6% -2% -8% -6% -12% -4% -13% -5% -11% 2% 1%
1% -6% 11% 5% -9% -4% -1% 4% 0% -6% -4%
-4% -6% 10% 3% -2% -8% -1% -4% -4% -3% -3%
2% -1% 7% 1% 0% 0% 4% 15% 4% -4% -9%
3% -1% 5% 2% 8% 14% 9% 12% 3% 9% 1%
7% -4% 6% 6% -8% -6% 10% 11% -4% -2% -6%
3% 7% 15% 12% -5% -5% 6% 7% 0% 4% 5%
9% 9% 17% 16% -2% 0% 13% 16% 15% 17% 16%
3 1 35 36 0 139 40 41 4 43 44
0% -3% -4% -1% 0% -5% -6% 0% 9% 1% 2%
-5% -3% -5% 9% 7% -2% -4% -7% -3% -7% -4%
0% -1% -2% 2% 2% 1% -3% 6% 8% 5% 6%
14% 1% -1% 2% -1% 1% -2% 5% 12% 8% 9%
4 0 553 54
12% 13% 9% 11% 6% 10% 8% -11% -2% -5% 2%
8% 9% 0% 12% 4% -9% -4% -1% 1% -4% 9%
8% 6% 3% 10% 5% -5% 10% 3% 1% -1% -7%
6% 5% -1% 1% -10% -6% 5% 4% 21% 19% 4%
3% -7% -5% -9% -8% -7% -11% -7% -6% -9% -1%
7% -10% -6% 5% 5% 3% -6% 4% 2% 4% 7%
0% 0% 3% 15% 12% 6% 3% 10% 6% 9% 3%
8% 11% 17% 18% 16% 8% 7% 11% 8% 13% 6%
67 08 ,, 70 71 2 73l74 7 76 t 77
-2% -3% 1% 2% -7% 8% N/A N/A N/A 3% 8%
6% 4% -1% -1% 3% -9% N/A N/A N/A -6% -3%
2% 2% 7% 6% -1% -10% -10% N/A N/A 8% 10%
4% 9% 10% 9% 1% -12% -10% N/A N/A 7% 17%
78 79 80 1 t 8 87 88
-7% 8% -8% -13% N/A 5% -4% -4% 9% -8% -7%
-2% -9% -1% -1% N/A -11% -1% 7% -2% 5% -3%
-9% -10% -8% 1% N/A -4% 15% 15% 8% 9% 7%
-3% -12% -2% 5% N/A -5% 17% 11% 10% 13% 15%
34 Each number is matched with the individual survey article, which is attached with summary statistics over
MSAs.
